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PREFACE

This study is intended to give a survey on reconstruction,
not as it affected the South, economically, politically or socially,
but as it developed and expanded in Congress.

The Radical program

on reconstruction has been traced from the first recommendations
of Stevens in December, 1865* down to its culmination in the Re
construction Act of March 2, 1867.

Auxilliary phases of the Radi

cal program, such as the Freedmen* s Bureau, have been touched upon
only in so far as they influenced, or had direct effect upon, Con
gressional reconstruction.
A study of the debates was made, to see on what grounds, and
by what means, the Radicals were able to promote such a plan as
the Act of 1867.
information.
ments.

The debates are not satisfactory as a source of

The decision on the bill was not reached by the argu

The debates were based on emotion and passion, were lack

ing in substance, and showed little evidence of thought or judg
ment.

In fact, the question was not one of debate, but of propa

ganda.

The second problem then was to sift out the propaganda,

and discover just what its effect had been on Congress, and on
the speakers there.
There are no satisfactory accounts of the debate.
his "Twenty Years in Congress," is the best.

Blaine, in

He discusses the

subject, but his treatment is necessarily unsatisfactory, because
of his Radical prejudice, and his desire to justify his party.
Miller, editor of "Great Debates in American History," devotes a
good deal of space to reconstruction, but he appears to have
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derived his outline from Blaine, and padded it with quotations
suggested by him.

Because of this, the discussion suffers from the

same faults as the earlier work.

Neither of these writers gives

any attention to the background of propaganda, on which the debate
was based, and without which it loses its full significance.
The study has been made interesting by the people who have
taken leading parts.

Such men as Sumner, Stewart, Shellabarger,

and Conkling could never be uninteresting.

Thaddeus Stevens put

fire into everything he touched, and he was the prime mover of the
party.

President Johnson, an unusually picturesque figure, was

always in the background.
In order to understand the South of today, one must have an
understanding of the reconstruction period.

And to understand

fully reconstruction in the South, it is necessary to make a care
ful study of its development in Congress.

CHAPTER I

CONSOLIDATION OF RADICAL STRENGTH

1.

CHAPTER I.
CONSOLIDATION OF RADICAL STRENGTH

Joint Cor^ittee.
President Lincoln had begun, and President Johnson had
continued, the organization of loyal civil governments in the
southern states.

By December, 1865, when the thirty-ninth

Congress met, these governments were functioning, and reconstruc
tion was almost complete.

Most of the members of Congress were

pledged to support the Executive plan of reconstruction, with its
three principles of ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
repudiation of war debts, and declaration that the secession
ordinances were null and void.

And not only by Congress, but by

the North in general was this policy accepted.
But there were indications of approaching trouble— "the
rumbling of Congressional ambitions,"

1

"How to steer clear of the

parties and personal contentions of Congress is now my chief responslbllity," wrote Seward in November.

2

But even he did not

dream of the full significance of the rumblings, for he thought
that the first of the year would see "the clearing up shower of
faction."-^
In December, 1865, there were in Congress about twentyfive extremists, in both houses, who opposed the President's plan*
Among them v/ere several very able men— clever political manip
ulators, accomplished speakers, experienced and wily politicians*
The most influential was Thaddeus Stevens.^
known as an advocate of extreme measures.

He had always been

In the thirties he

2.

had been a vigorous Anti-Mason.

When the slavery issue rose he

found a real scope for his talents.

He had opposed the pro

slavery measures of the Compromise of 1850.

He had ?mnted war,

in 1861, because he believed that it would inevitably result in
the fall of slavery.

He had been one of the first to demand

emancipation, and the arming of the negroes.
Lincoln in I864. because of emancipation.
struction was original.

He had supported

His attitude on recon

He had originated the "conquered prov

ince theory" on the status of the South; he desired a territorial
government for the conquered South; he demanded universal and
impartial male suffrage in the South, providing always that the
hated rebels were excluded.

He would provide for the negroes by

a scheme of wholesale confiscation of rebel property.

5

Hardly less important than Stevens were several others.
Williams, Howard and Morrill in the Senate, and Washburn and
Shellabarger in the House held the same views, and were his de
voted and able co-workers.

Conkling and Boutwell contributed

materially to the program.
These men were all ambitious; a few of them were motivated
also by genuine convictions.
Executive reconstruction.
opposition.

They all opposed Johnson, and

There were several reasons for this

Party considerations were foremost.

If the

Southern representatives should be admitted to Congress in the
near future, it would be possible for them to unite with the
Democrats, North and South, and so control Congressional pol
icies.

Negroes in the South might help to swing some Republican

elections, but they had no vote.

It was imperative, either that

the negroes be given the vote, and so insure some Republicans

3.

from the South, or that the negroes he excluded from the basis of
representation so that the dangerous number of Southern represent
atives would be cut down*

In addition to this, there was a very

prevalent feeling that Congress had lost ground during the late
war, and that it was high time its power should be reasserted.
Many of the members also felt a genuine hatred of the South.
This motive was especially strong with Stevens, who had never for
given the Confederates for destroying his iron works at Chambersburg.^
These leaders then, when Congress opened, had four chief
objectives on v/hich to concentrate their efforts.
1. It was Imperative that they secure a delay on the progress
of Johnson’s plan of reconstruction, so as to give them
time to perfect their own plans and machinery.
2. They must prevent the entry of southern representatives
Into Congress*
3. They must Influence public opinion, both in Congress and
throughout the country, in such a way as to Increase
their faction. In Congress they must have enough to
make a majority.
4. It would facilitate matters if they could force an open
break between Congress and the President.
With this program before them, these members assembled in
Washington in early December.

Stevens tried, for the last time,

to force his views on Johnson, but he failed.

On December 1

these men held a caucus, to concentrate and organize their
strength.

Hereafter they were known as the Radical faction of

the Republican party.

The first thing to be done was to prevent

the Senate from admitting southern representatives.

If this

could not be done, then Stevens' program in the House would be
useless.

The caucus decided that the problem could be solved by

-4*

securing a Joint Committee, to which would bo referred all matters
of reconstruction.
The regular Republican caucus met the next day.

Fortunately

for the Radicals, Morrill, a Radical from Vermont, was chairman.
He appointed a committee to decide what to do about the southern
representatives, and, according to schedule, Stevens was a member
of the committee.

Stevens presented his ready-prepared plan for a

Joint Committee, and the resolution seemed so innocent that the
Conservatives were completely deceived.

Even Raymond, the ablest

of Johnson*s friends, failed to see its significance.

The same

committee, dominated by Stevens, quietly directed the Clerk of the
House, McPherson, to leave off the roll the names of every person
who claimed to represent any one of the eleven seceded states.
On December

7

when Congress met for the first time, the

Clerk of the House, when he called the roll, obediently omitted
the names of all Southerners.

Protests were unavailing.

When

Brooks demanded to know why the names were omitted, McPherson
attempted to explain, but Stevens hastily interrupted.
know,” he interposed.
questions.

"We all

McPherson took the hint, and evaded later

The election of officers was forced through with no

opportunity for nominations.

Wilson, of Iowa, presented a ticket

of candidates, with a resolution that they be all elected.

Objec

tions were evaded by parliamentary technicalities and the whole
ticket was elected, by a strict party vote.
all Democrats.)

(133 yeas, 35 nays,

Truly this was "revolutionary.n

of Radical sympathies, was the Speaker.

Schuyler Colfax,

His speech of acceptance

was an impassioned bit of Radical propaganda.
Thon Stevens rose to present his Resolution.

He wished to

5

establish a joint Committee, of fifteen members, nine from the
Rouse, and six from the Senate,
"to inquire into the condition of the States which
formed the so-called Confederate States of America,
and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled
to be represented in either House of Congress, with
leave to report at any time, by bill or otherwise;
and until such report shall have been made, and
finally acted on by Congress, no member shall be
received into either House from any of the so-called
Confederate States; and all papers relating to the
representation of said States shall be referred to
the said Committee without debate. " 10
This was a joint resolution, and so required the Presidents
signature.

A concurrent resolution would not require this, but

Stevens wanted to force the issue with the President.

If Johnson

refused to sign the resolution, he at once made a break with
Congress.

If he accepted it he virtually abandoned his own plans

of reconstruction.
The vote here was exactly like the vote on the election of
officers.

All the Union party supported the resolution, and thus

voted against Johnson.

All the thirty-five Democrats opposed the

resolution. 11
The Senate was more cautious.

The resolution was postponed

twice, and was accepted on December 11, only after amendment.

12

The Senate resolution was concurrent, and so did not require the
Presidents signature; the Senate refused to pledge itself to admit
no Southern members until the committee reported. 1-3

December 14

the House accepted the amended Senate resolution, but Stevens ad
vanced a new resolution which included that part of the original
plan which had now been omitted, and this passed.1"^
This success was the first Radical victory.

By it they

secured the first two of their desired objectives— delay, and the

6

exclusion of Southern members from Congress*

In the House they

had succeeded in inveigling all of the Republicans, even Johnson*s
friends and supporters to accept their plan*

As Gideon Welles

wrote, "The new members, and others weak in their understandings,
were taken off their legs, as was designed, before they were aware
of it . " 1'5 True, it was an unwitting betrayal, on the part of
Johnson*s friends, but nevertheless important, as it gave the
Radicals an advantage*

Johnson was aware of their gain, and spoke
16

of the organization of the Committee as political intrigue.’
the Senate the program was not quite so successful.
about half the Onion party accepted it*

in

There, only

But the Senate*s action

shows they were not wholehearted in their support of Johnson, or
they would have refused the resolution in any form*

Yet they were

not wholly in sympathy with the Radicals, either, since they
modified the most objectionable features of the resolution.

These

Conservatives in the Senate and the House were in a very Important
position.

They held the balance of power between the Democrats

and the Radicals.

The stake for which Stevens worked was the

possession of these ten or twelve men.

Johnson did not sense

their significance, made no efforts to secure their support, and
so in the end he lost them.

Of the fifteen members of the Joint Committee, nine were
Radicals, three were Conservatives, and three were Democrats.

The

Senate sent three Radicals— Williams of Oregon, Howard of Michigan,
and Harrlss of New York; two Conservatives— Fessenden of Maine,
and Grimes of Iowa; and one Democrat— Reverdy Johnson of Maryland.
The House members were six Radicals— Stevens of Pennsylvania,

7

Conkling of New York, Boutwell of Massachusetts, Morrill of
Vermont, Washburn of Illinois, and Blow of Missouri; one Conserv
ative— Bingham of Ohio; and two Democrats— Grider of Kentucky and
Rogers of New York.
Of the nine Radicals, Stevens, Conkling, Boutwell and
Williams were the most important and active.

Blow soon came under

the Influence of Bingham and was lost to the Radicals.

All three

of the Conservatives were active, Fessenden perhaps most so.
Welles says that Grimes controlled Fessenden but if so he remained
in the background.

17

Reverdy Johnson was the only important

Democrat.
The Radical plan suffered one small setback.

Fessenden, a

Conservative, was named chairman of the Senate group, by that body,
18
and thus automatically became chairman of the Joint Committee."
It would have been more satisfactory if a Radical had been chair
man, but this was not so serious an inconvenience as might have
been expected.

Early Work o£ j&£ £ & & £
On January 6 , 1866, when the committee met for the first
time, at Stevens1 instigation a sub-committee was appointed, to
wait upon the President, asking him to take no further action with
regard to Reconstruction, in order ”to avoid all possible colli
sion or misconstruction between the Executive and Congress, in
19

regard to the relative position of Congress and the President.”
Johnson handled the matter very skillfully, and announced that,

I

s.
while he "considered it desirable that this natter of reconstruc
tion should be advanced as rapidly as night be consistent with
public interest, still he desired to secure harmony of action
between Congress and the Executive, and it was not his intention
to do more than had been done, for the present,"

20

The first bill which the committee framed had to do with
representation.

The

uestion involved here was of peculiar

importance to the Radicals, since it concerned the number of
southern representatives.

In I860, by the three-fifths compromise,

the South had eighteen men in Congress representing negroes.
After the war, if all the negroes were counted, the South would get
21
twelve more— thirty in all.
Since no negroes voted it was certain
that none of these thirty representatives would be Republicans.
Most of the Republicans in Congress v/ere bothered by this problem,
and there had already been a good bit of discussion of it.

Early

in December, Stevens had proposed that the Constitution be amended

so that representation would be apportioned among the states
according to the number of voters.

22

Conkling was loud in support

of the measure, but Blaine opposed it vigorously.

23

His chief

argument was that such a method of apportionment would be unfair,
since New England had fewer voters in proportion to her population
than other sections of the country.2^

This was due to the educa

tional qualifications and the preponderance of women.

Other New

Englanders supported Blaine, and Stevens quietly withdrew his
proposition.
When the Joint Committee caiae to consider the question it
adopted a plan of Blaine*s which v/as acceptable to New England.
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the

9.

several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
Ln each State, excluding Indians not taxed; provided that when
ever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any
state on account of race or color, all persons of such race or
jolor shall be excluded from the basis of representation." *
Chi3 was agreed to in the Joint Committee with only one dissenting
irate, that of Rogers.
manifestly unfair.

Reverdy Johnson was absent.

The bill was

It affected only the South, since it was only

there that negroes were numerous enough to affect representation.
"No northern state will lose by it; even New York, with her great
population has so few blacks that she could exclude them all from
snumeration, and it would make no difference in her ropresenta27
tion."
Too, if any one state in the South denied the franchise
to negroes, all the negroes everywhere ln the Soxith were to be
sxcluded.

This might mean injustice to ten 3 tates, because of the

action of the eleventh.

There was the additional point that only

six states in the North gave negro suffrage at that time.

A

single Northern state could deprive all the South, without affectLng her own r ’presentation, or that of other Northern states.
On January 21, Stevens reported the resolution to the House,
le desired that it be passed at once, so as to be sent to the
state legislatures in time for them to act on it before adjourn
ment.

He thought two hours debate ought to be sufficient, but

the debate continued intermittently for a week, when the bill was
28
sent back to the Committee.
On Stevens1 suggestion, the Com
al ttee struck out the words "and direct taxes," and returned It to
the House, which passed it the same day.2^

In the Senate,

10,

Sumner’s opposition prevailed, and the Resolution failed.*
The question had not provoked any brilliant debate*

Ike

supporters of the amendment harped on the question "Shall one
white man have as much share in the government as three other
white men, merely because he lives where blacks outnumber whites
two to one?”'

Stevens, Fessenden, and Conkling all brought this

’'unfairness” out, and it was the chief argument used in support of
32
the bill.
Opposition arguments were somewhat better. They main
tained that the right to representation does not necessarily in•aig

volve the right to vote."

They pointed out that the principle

"no taxation without representation "was violated by the W U » ^ *
They asked way, since the North was so concerned about the right
of the negro to vote, the North did not grant her own negroes the
suffrage, and if the theory of human rights was so much involved
in suffrage, why not grant the franchise to women?-^

And if fair

ness was so important to the Republicans, why did they not do
something about the senate, where New England1s twelve members
36
dominated?~
The question of civil and political rights for the negro
loomed almost as large as that of representation.
of the South precipitated the discussion.

The Black Codes

The Radical press

demanded a Constitutional amendment guaranteeing to the negro
37
equal rights with the white.
Discussion was general. On Decem
ber 4, 1865, Sumner presented his famous resolutions, sections of
which demanded ncomplete enfranchisement of all citizens, and
• • . no denial of rights on account of color,"2®

Two days later

Farnsworth presented a series of resolutions very extreme in tone,
in which he advocated equal franchise and civil rights for negroes.

n.
He believed that to admit traitorous whites, and exclude loyal
3d
blacks, would be nmercy without justice— a crime#"
The Com
mittee took up this problem as soon as that of representation was
considered.

There was much disagreement within the committee, but

finally they agreed on the following resolution:
"The Congress shall have power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper to se
cure to the citizens of each state all privi
leges and immunities of citizens in the several
states; # . . and to all persons in the several
states equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty and property#1"*0
The vote in committee on this resolution stood 7 to 6 #
Kadicals, ktevens, Conkling and Harris, opposed i t . ^

Three

Qn Feb

ruary 13, Bingham reported the resolution to the House, which re
ceived it without enthusiasm.^

It was recommitted to the Com

mittee, again reported, deferred, and never heard from again until
it appeared as Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment

fervid the Join! .gflnffi&tltefi

i M nqfliSajg.

January 6 , 1866, the Joint Committee appointed four sub
committees "to examine and report upon the present condition of
the states composing the late so-called Confederate States of
America."^

One of these sub-committees was concerned with only

one state, Tennessee.
There had been much discussion and argument in Congress over
the advisability of admitting Tennessee*

It was generally con

ceded that the state needed no reconstruction, and was probably
entitled to admission, but Congress hesitated to accept her

12.

representatives, for fear of establishing a precedent which might
prove inconvenient later.

Nevertheless, there was a fairly 3trong

£.nd general sentiment favoring Tennessee.
There was some reason for this special favor.

In East Ten

nessee there had been forty thousand votes cast against secession.
!1iose loyal men had supported the Union all through the war, and
aiany of them had served in the Northern aray,^

In 'larch of 1862,

President Lincoln had appointed Andrew Johnson as military governor,
he had been very popular and successful.

In January, 1865, a

Constitutional Convention created a new state government which was
acceptable.

The new Constitution, ratified February 22, declared

ihe secession laws null and void, as well as other acts of the
Confederacy, and repudiated the Confederate debts.
were gratifying also*
.'ifteen years,

The state laws

Rebels were excluded from the franchise for

A strict oath was prescribed.

;soldiers were permitted to carry side-arms.

Discharged Union
Citizens were released

:’rom paying state and county taxes for the years of 1862 , 1863,
:.86A*

A reward of $ 5,000 was offered for the apprehension of

:shan G, Harris, governor of the state in 1861, because he "did
use his position as governor to put the state in rebellion."^
The sub-committee on Tennessee consisted of two Conservatives,
Jrimes and Bingham, and one Democrat, Grider.^

They secured

records of the Constitutional Convention, acts of the State legis
lature, received petitions and examined witnesses*

mre all questioned in Washington,

The witnesses

Only ten persons were called,

111 the members of the Tennessee delegation to Congress were
examined, and they all testified that the position of the loyalists
In Tennessee would be greatly strengthened if they were represented

13.

in Congress.

This opinion was stressed by all the witnesses.

Hie

Questions asked were stock Questions, and the answers were satis
factory*

animosity was chiefly personal.

Public sentiment was

loyfxl to the federal government.

The condition of the negro was
/o
The Freedman*s bureau was working to great advantage.

good*

February 15 the sub-committee reported that Tennessee had
presented a constitution which was Republican in its form of
government, and that the state was entitled "to be one of the
United States of America, on an equal footing with the other states
50
In all respects whatever."
The resolution to this affect was
amended, reamended, and finally rejected.

On the motion of

Williams, the whole subject of Tennessee was referred to a new
sub-committee*
7 nay.

51

The vote on this suggestion accepted it, 8 yea to

It is important as it marks a realignment of sympathies

within the Committee.

Harris and Blow deserted the Radical fold,

and supported the Conservatives.

After this time Harris wavers

between the two, but Blow became positively Conservative, and an
ardent supporter of Bingham.
nificance.

Fessenden*s vote was of great sig

He supported the new sub-camraittee, and thus placed

himself for the first time with the Radicals.

If he had refused

his vote here the new sub-committee would have failed to material
ize, and the report of the first one would have been accepted by
the Committee.

Sentiment in Congress was growing so favorable

that it seems very probable that Tennessee would have been admit
ted without any difficulty.

This the Radicals were anxious to

prevent, if possible, and they hoped that the new sub-committee
would be able to do so.
In the appointment of the members of this new sub-committee

_____
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Fessenden shows his Radical leanings again, for he named Williams,
Conkling ana Boutwell, three of the most extreme .;embers of the
group*

«2

On the .morning of February 19, this sub-committee re

ported a resolution that Tennessee be accepted upon certain condi
tions?

X. The fctate must repudiate its rebel debts; 2. It should

"forever maintain in its constitution the provision . . . disavow
ing the doctrines of secession;" 3 . It must disfranchise all
rebels."^

The Joint Committee took no action on the resolution

that morning*

It was supposed that the President was to take ac

tion on the Freedman1 s Bureau Bill that day, and. the Radicals,
seeing an advantage if he returned a veto, wished to postpone the
decision.

The first three weeks of February were critical ones for the
Radicals.

Barly in the session they had been very successful in

their efforts.

They had been able to put across their program of

delay on Reconstruction, when they got the Joint Committee ac
cepted by Congress.

The same Committee assured them that the

Southern representatives would not be accepted.

They had been

making some progress with their propaganda program, and public
opinion was beginning to show its influence*

In February they

succeeded in swinging the Committee to a definite stand in opposi
tion to Johnsonian Reconstruction, when they so skillfully
engineered the Tennessee affair.

But they were not yet sure of

the House, and they were far from .sure of the Senate,

By a series

15.

of fortunate accidents, clever manoevering, and bold strokes, the
Radicals, under Stevens’ capable leadership, were able, within the
next two months, to gain both the House and the Senate.
As has been said, Johnson had suspected the Radicals from the
first.

He had believed that the Joint Committee was a political
54weapon leveled at him and his Reconstruction policy.
Any hopes
he might have had from the Southern representatives were gone when
Congress refused to admit them.
been refused*

Even the most loyal of States had

Tennessee was his o n state, and It would have meant

a great deal to him to have her accepted.

He had hoped that May

nard, in ardent loyalist, would be able to make same gains for
him, but Maynard was left with the rest of the representatives
from the South.

However, I d l e s was right when he said that

Maynard and the Radicals hand and glove, and Johnson would not

cc
have gained even if Tennessee had been admitted*

And perhaps

Vielles was right, for certainly Maynard was Radical later.
Yet Johnson’s position was far from hopeless.

There were

enough Conservatives in Congress to hold the balance of power
between the Democrats and the Radicals.

If Johnson had been more

of a politician, or if he had had a clever politician to advise
him, he might have compromised, and conciliated these few men.

The

Conservative leaders were not anxious to come to an open break with
the President.

But they would not accept his policy unless they

could guide its working out, and this Johnson would not have permitted.

Since no effort was made by the Executive to secure

them, they gradually drifted toward the Radicals.
Of course the Radicals seized their opportunity, and re
doubled their efforts to secure the favor of these Conservative

16

members.

Yet there was still grave danger that they night come to

some agreement with Johnson.

This must be prevented, and Stevens

embarked upon a deliberate policy of forcing a break between them
and the President.
Almost at once a series of unfortunate events opened the way.
On February 19, Johnson vetoed the Freedmenfs Bureau bill.

In his

veto message he attacked the bill as unconstitutional and ques
tioned the right of Congress to legislate in such a way for those
states which were without representation*

nTho original bill was

necessarily passed in the absence of the states chiefly to be
affected, because their people were then contumaciously engaged in
the rebellion.

How the case is changed, and some at least of

those states are . . « soliciting the allowance of the Constitu
tional right of representation.

At the time, however, of the

consideration and the passing of this bill, there was no Senator
or Representative in Congress from the eleven states which are to
57
be mainly affected by its provisions.”
Whan the Joint Committee met the next day, the order of
business would normally have boon a decision on the report of the
second sub-committee on Tennessee*

But ttMr» Stevens said his

opinion as to the expediency and propriety of this action . . .
had been materially changed since yesterday.

The first duty of

the committee was to declare the power of Congress over this subeft
ject of reconstruction.”^
He accordingly presented a resolution,
on ■;hich he asked immediate action.

"In order to close agitation

upon a question which seems likely to disturb the action of the
government, as well as to quiet the uncertainty which is agitating
the minds of the people of the eleven states which have been

17.
declared to be in insurrection, no senator or representative shall
be admitted Into either branch of Congress from any of said states,
until Congress shall have declared such state entitled to such
representation."
Resolution."
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This became known as Stevens’ "Declaratory

The vote in the committee stood 10 yeas to U nays

with Johnson absent.

Bingham and his new follower Blow were the

only Republicans to vote against it.^°
The next day Stevens presented the resolution in the House,
and moved the previous question.

The Democrats made valiant

efforts to delay the vote, but after six hours they saw the hope
lessness of it, and the division was called.

The vote was 109

yeas, all Republicans* 40 nays, 8 of theca Republicans, with Haymond among the number.
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Before the vote was taken, twenty-three

Republicans had left the House, to avoid the responsibility of
voting.

To catch these men, Stevens moved to reconsider the vote

the next day, "since several of our friends who are absent this
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evening were very anxious to vote." '

On February 21 the second

vote was taken, and again the resolution passed.^

Stevens had

now a definite commitment of the House.
Johnson himself just at this time made a mistake v/hich was
of utmost use to Btevens in forcing the breach.

On Washington’s

birthday, the ^resident spoke from the white House terrace to a
large audience which had come from a popular mass meeting.
speech was not as bad as it has been described.

The

Most of it was

devoted to a defense of his own policy, and was "earnest, honest,
and strong*

But some of it was in poor taste, and much that

he said was ill-advised.

For a few minutes Johnson lost his

judgment completely, and replied to the calls and questions from
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the croud.

He bandied jests about hi- trade as a tailor$ he spoke

of Stevens, Sumner, and Wendell Phillips, by name, as traitors;
he charged the Radicals with plotting to assaslnate him; he refused
to speak of Forney, because he did not want to "waste ammunition
on a dead duck."

But the greatest mistake came in an allusion to

the Joint Committee as a central directory, 1 a sort of dictatorial
body which was deliberately scheming to keep the South out of the
Union.^
The Radical press the next day made much of Johnson’s remarks
and hinted that he "had. had too much bad liquor to make a good
speech.

The country was scandalized at such lack of dignity

in the President.

Congress was angry at the unjust criticism of

the Joint Committee*

Johnson had alienated many people, and that

at a critical time? when he desperately needed new friends.
On February 2f, Fessenden presented Stevens’ resolution to
the Senate.

There was much more debate here- than in the House,

and it was of a more penetrating nature.

Johnson’s case was ably

presented, but when the matter came to a vote on March 2, there
were 29 yeas, and 18 nays.^

The open break between Johnson and

the conservative members of Congress was complete.

Both the House

and the Senate were committed against the President’s policy, and
his right to reconstruct the South.
liven yet Johnson’s position was not hopeless, nor was the
Radical position secure.
Civil Rights bill.

Johnson had not taken action on the

If he signed that, he could still gain enough

conservative Senators to block the Radical program.
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It seemed

cpiite probable that he would sign. Trumbull, Stewart and Sherman
0
^
,
,
,
69 All the members of
of the Senate, all understood that he would.
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his Cabinet, except Welles and Seward, advised that he should.
It was an anxious time for the Radicals.

Stevens tried to

goad Johnson into some indiscretion, by his usual method of an
noyance and near-insult.

On March 10, he made a most irritating

speech, at an unimportant Saturday session from which most of
Johnson*s friends were absent.

He began by professing feelings of

friendship and respect for Johnson.

His praise was interrupted by

Price, a Radical, who recalled Johnson*s references to Stevens In
the Twenty-second of February speech, and asked, "When I hear a
gentleman whom I suppose to be the Thaddeus Stevens referred to,
speak in such terms in favor of the President, I wish to know
whether he is the same gentleman?"

This was greeted with laughter,

which continued when Stevens answered,
"Does the gentleman suppose the speech to which
he refers was a fact? . . . Sir, that speech
was one of the grandest hoaxes ever perpetrated.
I am glad to have the opportunity to exonerate
the President from ever having made that speech.
(Renewed laughter.) It is a part of the cunning
contrivance of the Copperhead party, who have
been persecuting our President since the fourth
of March last. Why, sir, taking advantage of an
unfortunate incident which happened on that oc
casion, (laughter) they have been constantly de
nouncing him as addicted to low and degrading
vices. To prove the truth of what I say about
this hoax, I send to the Clerk*s desk to be
read, a specimen of this system of slander,
printed in the leading paper of the Democratic
party."
The Clerk read from the New York World, of March 7, 1865, an
editorial which deplored the fact that the Vice-Presidency was
now filled by an "insolent drunken brute, In comparison with whom
even Caligula*s horse was respectable."

Stevens went on—

"Vife never credit this slander. But our enemies
resort to another expedient. If ay friend be
fore me (Bingham) were trying a case of
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de lunatico inquirendo, and if the outside
evidence were doubtful, he would lead the
alleged lunatic to speak upon the subject
of his hallucination, and if he could be
induced to gabble nonsense, the intrinsic
evidence of the case would make out the
allegation of insanity* So, Mr. Speaker,
if these slanderers can make the people be
lieve that the President ever uttered that
speech, then.they have made out their case.
(Laughter. ) 71
Perhaps such tactics had something to do with goading Johnson
into changing his mind on the Civil Rights bill.

At any rate, on

March 27 he returned a veto.

Gaining ihe ££&£&£ & 2E

Radicals.

Early in March the Radicals turned thoir serious attention to
the situation in the Senate.

So far, the session had showed the

general conservative tendency of that body.

Out of the fifty

senators, there were only thirty on whom the Radicals could de
pend.

This was a safe majority, but it was four short of being

the two-thirds necessary to override a veto.

As the session pro

gressed, and Johnson’s use of the veto came to be understood, it
became increasingly necessary for the Radicals to gain the twothirds majority.

Without it, their program would be halted.

Al

ready Johnson’s veto had been able to kill the Freedmen’s Bureau
bill.

Speedy action was necessary if the Civil Rights bill was

not to suffer the same fate.
For reasons never satisfactorily explained, Stewart of
Nevada, Morgan of New York, and Willey of West Virginia, changed
their politics in March.

During the first part of the session,
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Stewart had been a staunch Administration Republican.

He had

influenced his friend Morgan to such an extent that Morgan also
was a Johnson man.

They both voted consistently with the Con

servatives until the end of March, when Stewart suddenly changed
on the Stocton affair, and Morgan followed him.

For the rest of

the session, with one exception, Stewart remained a dependable
party man.

On April 4, 1866, he presented a plan of reconstruction,
72
which was his last independent act.
Senator John P. Stocton, a Democrat from New Jersey, was the
fourth man selected by the Radicals as necessary to make their
two-thirds majority.

But they tried a new method here.

claimed to find a flaw in his credentials.

They

It was customary in

New Jersey for the legislature to elect representatives by a
majority vote.

Stocton had received a plurality, but the legls73
lature, by a special resolution, had voted to accept him.
When
Stocton presented his credentials to the Senate they were accepted.

Now, however, a question was raised, and the matter was referred
to the Judiciary Committee.
In the early part of February Senator Wright, Stocton* s
colleague, from New Jersey, had been taken ill.
home he had made a pair with Morrill of Vermont.

Before he went
Both men sup

posed that Wright would be ill only a short time, but he had not
returned by March.

Morrill was a Radical, and his party needed

his vote in the coming contest over the ejection of Stocton.
Accordingly, on Wednesday, March 21, Morrill, on Fessenden*s
advice, sent Stocton a letter notifying him of his intention to
break the pair.

Stocton showed the note to Reverdy Johnson, and

Johnson advised him not to notify

right, but said that he himself
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■'
would see Morrill,

The next morning, before the Senate was called

to order, Johnson talked to Morrill*

As a result of this inter

view, Morrill gave Stocton permission to wire Wright*

"Senator

Morrill wishes you to know that after allowing you a reasonable
time to get to Washington, he will consider himself at liberty to
7L
vote in my case.”
This telegram was read, and approved by
Morrill, and sent at once from the Senate chamber.
That same Thursday afternoon, the Judiciary Committee re
ported*

After a thorough investigation, the committee had come to

believe that Stocton*s election was legal.

There was only one

dissenting member of the committee— Clark, a Radical.

Trumbull

presented the report, together with a resolution to the effect that
Stocton was entitled to his seat.
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even Fessenden speaking against it.

This was vigorously opposed,
That day also, a petition

was received from certain Radical members of the New Jersey legis76
lature, requesting that Stocton be ejected.
Indeed, it was ad
mitted openly in Congress that the New Jersey legislature, al
though it had completed its session, was adjourning from day to
day, for no other purpose than to elect Stocton* s successor, as
soon as Stocton should be removed.
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On Friday morning Stocton received a protest from Wright.

He

read it to Morrill, and Morrill said that he did not know what to
do.
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The vote came up that afternoon.

If Wright had disobeyed

his doctor*s orders, and risked his life to go to Yashlngton to
be present for the vote, he would have had to leave his home on a
midnight train Thursday.

Even then he might have been too late.

This was Morrill’s "reasonable time,”
was also absent, ill in Washington.

Dixon, another Conservative,

He had arranged that, if
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necessary, he would be carried to the chamber on a stretcher, and
so cast his vote for Stocton.
The vote on Friday stood 21 to 20 In favor of Stocton*
Stocton had not voted; neither had Morrill.
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But just before the

vote was announced Sumner and Fessenden both called out, "Vote,
Mr* Morrill."

He allowed his name to be called, and brought the

vote up, 21 to 21.

Then Stocton demanded that his name be called.

For a moment the Radicals were too disconcerted to protest, and
before they made any move Stocton*s vote was recorded.

He had
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kept his seat by a vote of 22 to 21 .

Stocton supposed that the matter was closed.

Wright made no

effort to leave his sick bed and go to Washington.

But on Monday

Sumner unexpectedly moved to amend the Journal of the previous
82
Friday, so as to strike out Stocton*s vote.
This of course would
cost him his seat.

After an all day discussion, Sumner moved

"that the vote of Mr. Stocton be not received in determining the
question of his seat in the Senate."8^

This finally passed, with

out a division.
Wright was notified of the new turn of affairs.

Tuesday

morning, just preceding the revote, Stocton read a telegram from
him, in which he begged to have the case deferred until Thursday.
He would disobey his doctor, and promised to be present on that
.
8A
day.
The case had already been postponed once, from Monday the
19th, to Wednesday the 21st, so that Clark, a Radical, might be
in his place, 85

But it was no part of the Radical plans to delay

now, and so give Stocton another vote.
was refused,

Wright’s plea for delay

Morrill had made another pair, with Foster this

time, and he was absent.

Stewart, obeying orders, was absent
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Riddle of Delaware changed his vote for some mysterious

reason*

When the results were announced It was discovered that

ctn
Stocton had lost his seat.

The vote stood 23 to 20.

This disgraceful affair gave the Radicals their necessary twothirds majority in the Senate*

It Is also significant because it

shows so clearly the organization and cohesion of the Radical party.
"The Indecent, unfair, arbitrary conduct of the few master spirits
M
is most reprehensible,” wrote belies.
Morrill was not essential
ly dishonest, yet he broke his word at the bidding of the party.
Stocton himself described the situation perfectly.

•Morrill him

self was very uneasy, and very doubtful, and very anxious to do
right, and It was the pressure of his party friends that forced
him to give that vote.”

The party whip was to prove very useful

to the Radicals.
The two-thirds majority was gained none too soon.

While the

final vote was being called a message from the President was re90
celved. It was the veto of the Civil Rights bill.

It had been a memorable four months.

In December, some

twenty-five or thirty Radicals had perfected their organization
for the first time.

They had decided on a policy of deliberate

opposition to the President.

They had accepted the leadership of

Thaddeus Stevens, and under his guidance they had succeeded even
beyond their utmost expectations.

The first week of the session

they had, at one stroke, secured the necessary delay on reconstruc
tion matters, and prevented the entry of southern representatives
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Into Congress.

By the middle of February they had gained the

support of the Joint Committee} by the first of March they had
swung the House to their side; by the end of March they had secured
the Senate.

They had prepared their way, and now they were ready to begin
constructive Radical legislation.

Their first work was a plan of

reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment.
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CHAPTER II.
THE FIRST PLAN OF CONGRESSIONAL RECONSTRUCTION.

Day after day the debate had brought out persistent demands
for a Congressional plan of reconstruction.

The first day of the

session Stunner had presented his famous resolutions, setting forth
certain guarantees which Congress should demand from the South.
1. ”An honest recognition of the unity of the Republic.”
2. "Complete enfranchisoment of all citizens; . . .
denial of rights on account of color.”

no

3. Repudiation of the Confederate debt, and adoption of the
Federal debt.
<4. Equal educational systems for all, without distinctions
for race or color.1
Two days later Farnsworth of Illinois presented a series of
resolutions quite extreme in tone.

He would amend the Constitution

so as to provide for equal civil rights, and franchise for negroes.

2

On January 5, 1866, Rufus Spalding of Ohio presented another
series of resolutions, which defined the early ideas of radical
recons truetlon *
1. Qualified right of suffrage in the District of Columbia.
2, An amendment excluding negroes from representation,
except in states whore they were granted the suffrage.
3* An amendment prohibiting nullification and secession,
4>* An amendment requiring the South to repudiate the
Confederate debt, and to assume the Federal debt.
3

5. An amendment denying former rebels admission to Congress.
Stevens formally opened the debate on reconstruction on
December 18, 1865, when he expounded his ”eonquered province”
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theory.^

Much of the time for the next four months was spent In

exhaustive discussions of the condition of the South under Johnson
ian reconstruction.

The Radicals organized their debate very

cleverly, and bolstered their arguments with pseudo-proof.
was Carl Schurz* s report.

There

There were letters and reports from

officers of the Freedman*s bureau.

Every Radical in the South,

and they were legion, bombarded Congress with letters and lemorials.

Before many weeks of the session were gone the Radicals

had accumulated a very respectable quantity of "evidence.”
The debate brought out the general tenor of Congressional
opinion.

There were certain guarantees which almost all the

Republicans, even the Conservatives, demanded.

Four of these

concern us here.
1. Equal civil rights for negroes.
2. Some plan of equable representation.
3. The exclusion of rebels from holding offices, or from
being admitted to Congress,4
4. A repudiation of the Confederate debt, and a guarantee
of the national debt.
Most of the Radical propaganda centered around these four
points.

The most important "proof” which the Radicals had was the

report of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, on conditions in the
South.

The four sub-committees, appointed in January, 1366,

called, witnesses, and asked thorn stock questions, which were
calculated to draw out the type of answers desired by the Radicals.
As a result, the report seemed to indicate that there was great
need for legislation on those four points.
There were a number of plans for Congressional reconstruction
presented to Congress.

These were referred to the Joint Committee,
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and most of them were never heard from again.

Two of them, how

ever, were important— one formulated by Senator Stewart, and one
by Robert Dale Owen,

The S-SsssEfc Plan
On March 16, 1S66, Senator Stewart, of Nevada, proposed a
plan of reconstruction which was unique among all those suggested.
It considered the South as well as the Northt
1, Each southern state was to be recognized "as haring
resumed its former relations with the government."
Representatives were to be admitted to Congress when
the state had amended its constitution so as to give
negroes equal civil rights, to repudiate its war debts,
to yield all claims for liberated slaves, and to grant
the elective franchise to all persons on the same
terras. Those persons who had been qualified to vote
in 1860 were not to be disfranchised by any new tests
or conditions,
2* When these conditions had been complied with, and
ratified by a majority of the present voting popula
tion, a general amnesty was to follow.
3. The loyal states were "respectfully requested to in
corporate in their constitutions an amendment cor
responding with the one above described,"

4, The bill was "not intended to assort a coercive power
on the part of Congress in regard to the regulation
of the suffrage in the different states, but only to
make an appeal to their own good sense and lGve of
country, with a view to the prevention of serious
evils now threatened,"4
6
*
This plan was originally intended as a compromise,

With

it Stewart hoped to unite the President and all Republicans in a
common plan of action.
pects of success.

For a time there seemed to be some pros

The Radicals were not wholly in opposition to

it, as they interpreted the bill to provide for universal suffrage.
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Stewart and Henderson, in support of the bill said that Johnson
favored its principles.

7

Stewart, in a long speech in the Senate,

said, "The proposition which 1 have presented in this resolution
. . . has been endorsed by every leading Union newspaper throughout

a
the North, except perhaps the New York Times."

He cited a number

of prominent people, both Northerners and Southerners, who favored
it 9
Vben Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights bill, all hopes of unit
ing Congress and the President on a compromise measure vanished.
On April 4 Stewart presented his plan again, slightly modified.10
It was not received enthusiastically, and a week later Stewart
moved to amend it, so as to make it more acceptable to the Radi
cals.11

On April 16 he appeared before the Joint Committee and

addressed that group "at length, in support and advocacy of his
resolution,1”

But the bill was not seriously considered by the

Committee; in fact they did not even discuss it again.

Johnson,

when he vetoed the Civil Rights bill, had so alienated Congress
that any moderate plan of reconstruction was refused.

The Robert Dale Owen Plan.
The next plan considered was one brought forward by Robert
Dale Owen of Indiana,

He had been intensely Interested in the

Preedmen, since 1863 Mien he had. served as chairman of a govern
ment commission inquiring into their condition.

He had kept in

close touch with the South, and had been greatly distressed by
the failure of Congress and the Joint Committee to put forward some
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plan of reconstruction.

In March, 1866, he became so "exercised"

over the delay that he went to Washington, resolved to do what he
could "toward the judicious settlement of so vital a question,"
He drafted a proposed amendment to the Constitution, secured
the approval of Governor Morton, and then went to Stevens with his
plan.
1. "?Jo discrimination shall be made by any State or by the
United States, as to the civil ri&ts of persons, because
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
2. After July 4# 1876, "no discrimination shall be made by
any State, or by the United States, as to the enjoyment
by classes of persons, of the right of suffrage, because
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,”
3* Until July 4* 1876, no class of persons deprived of the
suffrage shall be included in representation.
4* Rebel debts shall be repudiated.
This was accompanied by a resolution,
"Whenever the above recited amendment shall have
become part of the Constitution, and any State lately
in insurrection shall have ratified the same, and shall
have modified its Constitution and lav/s in conformity
with the first section thereof, then all laws . • . con
fiscating the property of the inhabitants of such States,
or imposing on any of them pains, penalties, or disabilities,
because of their participation in the Rebellion, shall be
deemed and held to be repealed, . . . and senators and
representatives from such State shall be admitted, as
such.”U
Three classes of Southerners were excluded from office until
after July 4, 1876.

These included persons who were officers in

the United States army or navy, or members of the Thirty-sixth
Congress, or of the Cabinet in 1860, who had taken part in the
rebellion.15
Owen urged the advantages of the bill.

He held that the ne

groes were wards of the government, but added, "We can not separate
the interests of the negro from those of the planter.

If we chafe
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and sour the whites of the South* the blacks must necessarily
suffer t h e r e b y I h e negro was not yet ready for political rights.
That was no fault of his own, but he must not be given political
powers, which he would use unwisely.
tion.

There must be time for educa

In the Meantime, the whites were to rule, and the blacks

were to be protected by the government.^
Stevens was favorably impressed with the first part of Owen*s
proposition.

*1*11 be plain with you, Owen,” he said.

"V/e’ve

had nothing before us that comes anywhere near being as good as
this, or as complete.
the best of it.

It would be likely to pass, too.

That’s

he haven’t a majority, either in our committee or

in Congress, for immediate suffrage, and X don’t believe the
States have yet advanced so far that they would be willing to
ratify it.

I ’ll lay that amendment of yours before our committee

tomorrow, if you say so, and 1*11

go

But to the resolution, he objected*

my best to put it through,”^
"That will never dol

Far too

lenient.
Stevens did present the plan to the committee and he reported
that "All the Republican members received the proposal more or
less favorably. w ^
approved it.
tions.

Fessenden, Washburn, Conkling and Howard, all

Boutwell and Bingham accepted it with minor reserva

Outside the committee, Wilson "heartily approved it,” but

Sumner could not accept it.

He felt that to vote for it would be

to "palter with the right” since it contained ”a tacit recognition
that the ex-slave holders have a right to withhold suffrage from
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the freodmen for ten years longer.”

otevens was as good as his word, and advocated the amendment
in the committee.^

It was discussed, and on April 21 it was

_
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voted on, section by section, and passed*
Johnson, supported it.

oo

One democrat, Reverdy

On April 23, on Stevens’ motion, the

resolution was withdrawn, but the amendment was retained, and
ordered reported*

23

After the group had risen to depart some one

suggested that it would be courteous to wait a few days until
Fessenden, who was ill with the varioloid, should return*
proposal v/as agreed to, with far reaching results*

This

In the interval

between this meeting and the next, at which Fessenden was present,
there were Republican caucuses held separately by the members of
Congress from Rew York;, Illinois, and Indiana, "to consider vdiether
equality of suffrage, present or prospective, ought to form a
part of the Republican program for the coming canvass*”2^

"They

were afraid, so some of them told me,” said Stevens, "that if
there was ’a nigger in the wood pile’ at all, it would be used
against them as an electioneering handle, and some of them— hang
their cowardicel— might lose their elections.

By inconsiderable

majorities, each of these caucuses decided that negro suffrage,
in any shape, ought to be excluded from the platform, and they
communicated these decisions to us.
enough to maintain its ground.

Our committee hadn’t backbone

Yesterday the vote on your plan was

reconsidered, your amendment was laid on the table, and in the
course of the next three hours we contrived to patch together—
well, what you’ve read this morning . • . Damn the varioloial
It changed the whole policy of the c o u n t r y . " W h a t you read
this morning*’ was the first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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I M Fourteenth M s i t e B t .
The plan of Congressional reconstruction finally adopted grew
out of the Stewart resolution.

In committee that plan was amended

and reamended some twenty times, until it lost almost all traces
of the original <»

The resolution, as worked out by the committee,

provided*

1 . "Ho State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.®
2. Whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be
denied to any portion of its male citizens, the basis
of representation in such State shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of such male citizens.

3 . Until July 4 , 1870, all former rebels shall be excluded
from the right to vote for representatives in Congress,
or for Presidential electors.

4 . Neither the United States, nor any State shall assume
debts incurred in insurrection.2”
Section 1 was entirely new.

Section 2 was substantially the

old Representation Bill of January 20.
of whole-exclusion.”

Section 3 was na measure

Section 4 was Owen*s, in substance.

The resolution shows that it was “patched together.”

The

wording is not accurate and concise; the marshalling of ideas is
not logical and clear.

It Is difficult to understand why such a

piece of work should have been reported from the committee, or why
tiie committee considered three hours* time enough to draft so
important a resolution as an amendment to the Constitution, deal
ing with a problem so tremendously difficult as reconstruction.
On April 30 the resolution was Introduced into the two Houses
of Congress.

Stevens presented the bill to the House, with a
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brief speech of explanation. ^

Section 3 drew the fire of most of

the members, Republicans as well as Democrats.
ficult, if not impossible, to enforce:

It would be dif

it wa 3 a breach of faith,

to give the President power to pardon the rebels, and then dis
franchise them:

it was foolish to expect that a disfranchised

outlaw would, on July 4> 1670, suddenly become a true and loyal
citizen:

it was simply a party measure, designed to postpone a

restoration of the Union.

Stevens defended it.

"Give us the

third section or give us nothing. . , When party is necessary to
sustain the Union, I say rally to your party, and save the Union."
But in spite of Stevens* efforts it was evident that the third
section would be rejected.

A blunder of the Democrats saved it.

Several members of that party believed that, if this section were
retained as a part of the amendment, the whole amendment would
fail.

Accordingly, about twelve Democrats voted with the Radicals,

and the section was retained by a margin of only five votes.

On

Kay 10 the amendment wa3 passed as it had been reported.-^
In the Senate Fessenden reported the bill, and opened the
debate, but nothing was done for a lew days.

Several amendments

and substitutes were offered, but it was not until the last part
of May that the debate became serious.

Stewart, on May 24,

delivered what Kendrick calls "by far the most interesting and
statesmanlike speech that was made on the general subject of re
construction at any time during the session." ^ 1
equal franchise, and a general amnesty,

His thesis was

Clark of New Hampshire

offered a substitute for section 3 defining those ineligible for
Dffice, and this substitute was eventually incorporated into the
32
amendment.^
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The bill was so strenuously and effectively opposed that the
Radicals began to fear its defeat.

"Defeat of a party program could

not be borne; its effects would be disastrous.

A caucus was called^

and we witnessed the astounding spectacle of the withdrawal for
the time, of a great legislative measure touching the Constitution
itself, from the Senate, that it might be decided in the secret
councils of a party."
agreement.
ship.

After five days the caucus came to an

To the first section was aaded a definition of citizen

Section 2 remained the same.

Section 3 was discarded, and

a new one drawn up, enumerating those classes of persons ineligible
for office.

To section 4 was added a clause declaring that the

national debt was valid.
The matter came to a vote on June 8, and the amendment passed,
33 to 11, with one Republican and four Democrats absent.

Hie

House concurred in the Senate*s changes, on June 13. ^

MilAt the same time that the Fourteenth Amendment was drawn up,
the Joint Committee had formulated another bill, which was pre
sented to Congress with the amendment.-^

This was known as the

Restoration Bill, and provided that whenever the Fourteenth
Amendment should have become part of the Constitution of the
United States, and any state lately in insurrection should have
ratified the amendment, and have modified its constitution and
laws in conformity with it, the Senators and Representatives from
36
such state might be admitted into Congress.
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After the bill was Introduced on April 30, there was desultory
debate, in both houses, but nothing was done.

After May 29, when

the Senate caucus decided to change Section 3 of the amendment,
the Senate tabled the bill.
without taking any action.
it*

The House debated it f o r three months,
Finally, a motion was made to table

A division showed 101 yeas, 35 nays, and 4-6 not voting.

Both

houses had failed to take action on the bill which was the "cap
stone" of the whole matter of Congressional reconstruction.

This

bill "Was a constituent part of the proposed plan of reconstruc
tion, if that plan was to be reconstructive in anything more than
&

contingent sense.
The Radicals, however, must do something to show, at least by

implication, that Congress had made n real plan of reconstruction.
On July 19, word was received that Tennessee had ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment,

By the end of the session both houses had

admitted representatives from that state, and thus had given-the
impression that the other southern states would be received in the
same way, when they had ratified the amendment.

Seward wrote, on

July 23, "Congress . , . i s really engaged, at last, in removing
the

embarrassments which surround the Tennessee question, and is

preparing to admit that state.

This once done will be the har

binger of the final restoration of all*
fairs will . . .

My solicitude about af

be relieved when I see Tennessee restored*"^®

Many other people believed the same thing, which was just what the
Radicals wanted them to believe.

-
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On December 18, 1865# Stevens opened the debate on recon
struction, by expounding his famous "conquered province" theory,
or the >elation of the South to the Union.

For four years the

Confederate States had waged war with the Union, and had been
acknowledged belligerents by the United States and foreign powers.
This was supported by law.

Justice Grier, in his decision on the

Prize Cases, held that the southern states were belligerents, and
that a state of belligerency might exist even when the two parties
were not foreign nations.

The argument that the South did not

make war because the Constitution forbids it, was absurd.

It was

like saying that A did not kill B, because he could not have, since
the law forbids murder.
uals.

The war was waged by states, not individ

Individuals do not make war.

The Southern Confederacy con

sidered itself to be out of the Union.

In view of all this,

certainly the North was Justified in treating the South as a
conquered belligerent.
Congress must determine the condition of the conquered states,
and provide for their government.

This government should be

territorial in form, and the qualifications for voters should be
fixed, so as to exclude all rebels, and include all loyal persons
without regard to race or color.

The South should remain In its

territorial status until Congress had made any desired changes in
the Constitution.

Such changes should include a re-apportioning

of representatives according to voters and not population, and
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and should give the Federal government authority to levy export
duties such as would insure a proper tax on cotton.

Of course

these amendments would not be submitted to the southern states,
since they would be simply territories.

It should be solemnly

decided whether Congress or the President had the power to rein
state these provinces.

By all rights, the power belonged to Con

gress, and it was time that Congress should assert its sovreignty,
and assume something of the dignity of a Roman Senate.^
After this date, two men led the debate, Raymond of New York
for the Conservatives, and Shellabarger of Ohio for the Radicals.
The speeches of these two men epitomize all the argument made on
reconstruction, up to February, 1867.

Other speakers of both

JLO

parties simply fell into line, and worked over this material.

2 l

JM

ldJ& i M Radical Rebuttal.

Conservative Constructive Argument.
of the Union?

How did the South get out

The ordinances of secession simply declared an

Intention to secede.

The South failed to maintain its ground on

that intention, and was defeated by force of arms.
Radical Rebuttal.

The Southern states did not leave

the Union by virtue of any ordinances of secession.

They

left it when they superceded and destroyed loyal govern
ment in their states.

SfiBS-SKYatrAYg Constructive Argument.

Stevens was wrong when he

I
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said that the states forfeited their existence by the fact of
rebellion.

Individuals in the states may have done so, but the

states as states, did not.

There is no law which can punish a

state, as a state, for any act it may perform.

Our Constitution

can not, since it does not deal with states.
Radical Rebuttal.

The Conservatives have made a

distinction where none exists, in stating that the people
of a state may forfeit their rights, but that this does
not effect the condition of their state in the Union,
This says that individually, treasonable persons have no
political significance, but collectively, they can be
called a state, and take their places in the Union!

In

the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court judged that individuals
in the South "acted as states" in organizing the rebellion.
Court decisions to this effect may be summarized.
1. The rebel states "acted as states" In organizing
the rebellion.
2. All their citizens, innocent and guilty, were
thereby made "enemies of the United States."
3» Even though they were "enemies," they were not
"foreign states."
4. The United States may exercise over these people
both belligerent and sovreign power, and there
fore we may try Davis for treason, under our
sovreign power.
5. By inference. The states became enemy territory,
governed by enemies, and thus they can not have
been having any political rights in this Union.
It mocks the law to say that those people or states
have any right of government in the Union, when every
man, woman and child residing in them have been declared,
by two unanimous judgments of the Supreme Court, to be
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public enemies of the United States.
The Constitution does deal v/ith states.

It imposes

restraints and obligations upon them as states.

It secures

rights and confers powers upon them, as states.

In fact,

it has fifty or more important provisions which deal with
the states as states.
Congress assumed that the rebel states had no rights
as states, when the blockade was established, and when the
revenue and tariff acts gave preference against the South.

Conservative gfffla&EHfiUyg.

Southern states can not

be said to have forfeited their existence.

If there had been no

Constitution of any sort in them, then they would have ceased to
exist, but there never was a time when their organization as
states was destroyed.
Radical Rebuttal,

An organized rebellion can not be

an organized nstate.n

In those eleven districts there

was no obedience to law, except the law which compelled
the defiance of all "supreme lawsj" there was no govern
ment except one which enforced disloyalty to governments; there was no observance of the law of nations,
unless that is to be found in remorseless assassination
and murder.

CtenaqmttSfi

hzsmmt-

Since the states are

within the jurisdiction of the Constitution, they are really and
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truly states of the Union, just as they were before the war.
Their practical relations to the Constitution have been disturbed,
and our victory in the field has given us the means of restoring
their relations to the government.
Hadleal Rebuttal.

The combined forces of the Constitu

tion, public law, the dictates of reason, justice and
common sense, and repeated and unanimous decisions of the
Supreme Court, have established that organized rebellions
are not States, and have forfeited their powers and
rights as states*
States have none of the rights or powers of states
where they do not recognize their obligations and duties.
Johnson himself says that his power over reconstruc
tion comes from his Constitutional duty to guarantee to
every state in the Union a republican form of government.
If the old governments have simply come back, then the
states already have republican forms of government, and
reconstruction is not necessary.

In this the President

holds our opinion, and we can not attack him.

They attack

the President who hold that the old state constitutions
are still there in the South, for if that is true, then
Johnson has violated them.

AlfflMW.
afeS 2l i&S. Cqfl5,ervatly&§, No£ Refuted.
If we consider the South to have become a separate power,
and to have been out of the Union, then we have accepted the
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doctrine of state sovreignty, since that was their justification,
and the basis on which they committed their action.

If the South is not still in the Union, but became effectivelyseparated from it, then we can not speak of loyalty there, any
more than we can of treason.

Loyalty to the Union was loyalty to

a foreign nation, and treason to their own.

If the Confederacy was really independent, then it had the
right to contract debts, and we, having taken the country over,
have become heirs to those debts.

Foreign countries have made

claims for payment of debt on this theory, and the Secretary of
State has denied them, on the ground that the Confederacy could
not contract debts.

Yet if it was independent, surely it could

have done so.

S M Cff.aaBCYftfr&Y9 Rebuttal.

of j&e Radicals.
Ba&LfiaJ. j&flatogjyjcg itogaasat*

Reconstruction is and ought to

be a function of the legislative branch of the government.

The

Executive has overstepped his duty in undertaking to set up civil
governments in the South.
civil function.

The Executive oan not exercise any

Hence what he has done he has accomplished by

means of a usurpation of power.
Rebuttal.

The Constitution expressly
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gives to the President the duty to guarantee to every
state in the Union a republican form of government.
is what his reconstruction policy will accomplish.

This
He is

also justified, because his work in the South is simply a
continuation of his war duties, and falls under his power
as commander-in-chief of the array and navy.
It was the duty of Congress, as it was of all the
departments of the government, to attempt to prevent the
South from seceding.

The moment that this was accomplished,

and the insurrection v/as over, Congress ceased to have any
power over those states, except such as It has over any
state.

Radical Constructive Argument.

The southern states were surely

out of the Union, and they possess none of the attributes which
are necessary, under the Constitution, to readmit them to the
Union.

Therefore, they must remain either subject states or

territories, until they are ready for readmission.

To give them

the status of territories is the most generous thing to do.
.Q&nscyvatiYP

southern states are not

out of the Union, and never have been.

They tried to

leave, tout force of arms decided against them.

Therefore

they ought to be allowed to resume their normal relations
with the government.

In addition to these arguments, there was a very great deal
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ii
of discussion as to conditions in the South.^

'
-'5SSSJ
This was not true

parliamentary debate, but consisted simply of contradictions.

The

Radicals had their mass of "evidence and proof" for support, vhile
the Conservatives had practically nothing but Grants report to
fall back upon.

REFERENCES.

1)

Globe. 39 Cong., 1 sess., 2.

2)

Ibid.. 15.

3)

Ibid.. 133.

4)

Ibid.. 72-75.

5)

See in£ra.

6)

State* U37.

7)

Ibid.. 1432-1438; T^e weekly ■'fcflKfiggJ (Iowa) K.ev,3 ,
March 2 1 , I 860 ,

3)
9)

10 )

1754.
Ibid.
Ibid.. 1753.

1 1 ) .Ibid., 1906.
12 )

Journal,, 82.

13)

Owen, Robert Dale, "Political Results of the Varioloid.
Atlantic Monthly, XXXV, 661-662 (July, 1871).

14)

Ibid.. 663-664.

15)

Ibid.

16)

IbM., 662.

17)

IMl., 663.

18)

Ibid.. 664.

19)

Ibid.

20)

I M c U , 665.

21)

Journal. S3.

22)

Ibid.. 83-89.

23)

Ibid.. 89-97.

24)

Owen, 2 £, cit., 666 .

50.

25)

Owen, g&, clt.. 666.

26)

Journal. 97-115.

27)

H 5 fli jL§a.

28)

Owen, $2 , clt.. 667.

29)

GloM, 2459 e£ £eg.

30)

Globe. Garfield, 2463} Bingham, 2543} Blaine, 2460}
Flnck, 2461} Stevens, 2544} 2545.

31)

Kendrick, 321.

32)

Globe. 2265, 2560, 2798-2804, and 2770.

33)

Ibid*, 2939.

34)

3040.

35)

Journal, 117 e£

36)

Globe. 2265 and 2288.

37)

DeWitt, David Miller,
Johnson. 95.

38)

Seward, F. W., Seward a£ j^ishlngton, III, 331.

39)

GloJas, 72-75.

40)

Globe. 121-126, and 142-145.

41)

See infra.. Chs. Ill, IV, and V.

Impeachment arid l£l§l

Andrew

........... 11""

CHAPTER III
PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION

51.

CHAPTER III.
PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION.

Very shortly after the Radicals began to gain political
strength, they saw the necessity for winning public opinion.

Such

a program as theirs would surely fail if it was not backed by a
strong and constructive support.

Accordingly they made a deliberate

effort to gain converts for their party.

This effort is seen, not

only in the debates in Congress, but in the current literature of
the time.

The extent of Radical propaganda outside of Congress

can be discussed only briefly here, but a rapid survey of its scope
is necessary, to gain an understanding of Radical tactics.
Ever since the end of the war there had been published a
great deal of literature about the South, which had been eagerly
read and discussed by the people.

Radlca,l specialists made very

clever use of this interest, and flooded, the country with propa
ganda.

A number of influential daily newspapers, with their wide

circulations, supported the party, and these became invaluable
means of disseminating propaganda.

Of the important magazines,

the Atlantic Monthly, Harpers’ Monthly, and Harpers’ Weekly were
strongest in their support of the Radicals.
There were a number of avenues by which the Radicals ap
proached their purpose.

A very important one was abuse of the

President, both personal and political.

Sometimes this was subtle

and guarded, but more often, especially as the Radicals gained
confidence, it was vulgar and crude.

One sample will suffice.

"On the twenty-second of February, the birthday of
Washington, Andrew Johnson disgraced himself (if that were
possible) and outraged the memory of Washington and the memory
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of all the dead heroes of the Republic, by making a speech
to a crowd of rebels and Copperheads* • • • Mever before
was the Presidential office so disgraced by its occupant.
Shame on the nation that places such babbling, drunken
idiots in places of power.
The same article uses the following epithets:

"His Boya.l Drunken

ness,11 "Andy the Befuddled," "Andy the Mellow," "His Bachanalian
Majesty," "The Old Sot," "The last American Pharaoh," "Andy of
assassination fame," "A bullet-headed President, made president by
a bullet," and others still more objectionable.

The Radical press

was filled with abuse of the kind, and even respectable journals
2
and magazines sometimes printed it.
Of course, reports of outrages in the South were played up
extensively.
Radicals.

This was, perhaps, the most affective weapon of the

They never let an opportunity slip to publish, to

relate, or to hint at, stories of trie terrible sufferings of the
loyalists in the South, whose only crime was loyalty to the Union.
Scores of articles were written, travelers* reports were featured,
letters supposed to have been written by loyalists were published.
Of course, current news events were utilized.

An instance of this

was the Mew Orleans Riot which furnished rich material, not only
on outrages, but on the culpability of Johnson,^

Stories of
5
Freedmen became popular, and were printed everywhere.
Essays and
editorials were used, of course, and even book reviews were not
neglected.

The Atlantic Monthly reviewed two books together,

Abbott "Prison Life in the South," and Moen "English Travellers
and Italian Brigands," in order that an opportunity might be made
to compare Southerners unfavorably with the Italian brigands.^
War horrors were recalled, and kept in circulation, in order to
7
stir up sectional feeling.
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The propaganda of the Radicals in Congress Is more important
for the purpose of this study.

Vihen the first session of the

Thirty-ninth Congress met in December, 1865., the Radicals began
their campaign to convert men to their politics.

Some of the same

methods of attack were used here as were used outside of Congress.
Especially were reports of outrages stressed, told in letters or
by hearsay.
Sprinkled all through the debate, from early meetings of the
first session In 1865, down to the passage of the Reconstruction
Act in 1S67, fire letters, purporting to have been written by
persons In the South,

These persons were supposed to be northern

travellers, or, more often, southern loyalists.

With one accord

they painted gloomy pictures of the shocking conditions In the
South, and implored Congress to act at once in their behalf, lest
they be brutally murdered, or at the very least, driven out of
their homes.

They usually suggested a plan of intervention, and

the plan coincided with the particular scheme which happened to
be In favor with the Radicals at the time.

These letters were

written to Radle&l members only, and the recipients thoughtfully
vdthheld the signatures.

The excuse was that if the Identity of

the persons became known, they would surely meet some dreadful
destruction.

S u m e r appears to have received more letters than

anyone else.

(Perhaps he was a more prolific letter writer.)
8
In one speech he quotes parts from thirty-four letters.
^.ir. Sumner. I have in my hands a letter from Alabama,
from Milch I will read a short extract, as follows:
*Another big trade is going on: that of running
negroes to Cuba and Brazil. They are running through
the country dressed in Yankee clothes, hiring men,
giving them any price they ask, to make turpentine

on the bay, sometimes on the rivers, sometimes to
make sugar. They get them on the cars. Of course the
negro don*t know where he is going. They get them onto
the bay, and tell them to go on the steamer to go around
the coast, and away goes poor Cuffee to slavery again.
They are just cleaning out this section of the country
of the likeliest men and women in it. Federal officers
are mixed up in it, too,'
Mr. Johnson.
the writer.

vvho writes the letter?

Give the name of

Sumner. It is from a person in Alabama, whose name I
am requested not to communicate; but the gentleman is
well mown to members of the other house.

IS r .

”Mr. Oufaaor. I have in my hand a letter which I received
yesterday from a friend of our cause in Texas, and which
is so important in its statements . . . that with the
indulgence of the Senate I will read briefly from it.
Mr. icDougall. Allow me to ask the Senator to read the
signature.Get the name of the writer be given.
ir. Sumner.

I shall not read the signature—

Me * yfaitaftsaU*

am

am

’r . Summer. And for a very good reason— that I could not
read the signature without exposing the writer to violence,
if not to death. The letter is dated in Texas, November 19,
1866. . . . I read as follows*
*Dear sir; The really loyal men in this part of Texas
concur in thinking that the first duty of the Republican
party at the approaching session of Congress should be
the passage of an act abolishing the sham state govern
ments that have been set up in the South without authority
of law. . . .
Our so-called Legislature adjourned on Tuesday last.
It was a worse and more disloyal body than the convention.
All its members, except about six, showed by their speeches,
proposed bills, and acts, that they were not merely in
law, but in fact, public enemies of the United States.
The laws they have passed are infamous, and amount to
neither more nor less than a cunningly devised system in
tended to affect a practical restoration of slavery. For
example* • . . The leading object of our legislature
seemed to be to make contracts to labor specifically enforcable, and at the same time, by stay and exemption
laws, the contracts to pay for labor unenforcable, . • •
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I learn from persons of character that some of the
members of our "Legislature" (Mr. Short, an ex-rebel
captain for instance) boasted in private that they had
never taken the amnesty oath prescribed by the President,
and that in one county of Texas where only thirteen of
the inhabitants had taken the oath, some two-hundred voted
at the last election.
We have been in a horrible state of suspense here.
Had the earlier northern elections gone against the
Republican party I should have had to promptly make my
escape from Texas, if indeed, I could have got off at
all. The spirit of the rebellion, down to that time,
had waxed fiercer and more intolerant than it was in the
middle of 1861. . . . If Congress does not wipe out all
that has been done, but abandons the loyal whites and the
poor freedaen to rebel rule, I must and will emigrate.
Many others will do the same. In what a horrible condi
tion will those be who can not get away!’
Memorials were used in the same way, but were infrequent,
perhaps for memorials must be signed.
"M£• S&BSll* I had intended, before I closed, to have
read an extract from a memorial addressed to this house
by Judge Thomas J . Durant, of Hew Orleans, in behalf of
the loyalists, in which he describes truthfully the
condition of that country, the murders and outrages that
prevail, and I laight rviad from the scores of letters just
sent to the venerable gentleman near me (Mr. Stevens) which
are enough to stir the blood of age, and ought to convince
us of the necessity of early and prompt action. I will
ask to have the concluding portion of the memorial read.
*We pray you then, to set aside these hostile
organizations, illegally and unconstitutionally created
and incapable of self government, because hostile to
the nation; and, under the nation’s power as conservator
of the peace, authorize the loyal and true men, regard
less of race or color, to organize governments, exclud
ing so many of the unrepentant rebels as shall be found
necessary for the permanent securing and preservation
of the Union. . , . We plead for these things, not for
ourselves and fellow-sufferers only, tut for our still
bleeding country, from which capital, enterprise, free
labor, free speech, the blessings of education, the
rapid strides of internal improvements, and large pro
gressive views are virtually expelled by ignorance,
stupidity, bigotry, treason and rebellion.
We ask for early, speedy, sharp, short, and
decisive action; and we ask it in the names and behalf
of the millions of devoted friends of the Union in
habiting the best parts of the continent, no one of
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whom can claim that he enjoys the blessings of free
republican government, or the security which the
Constitution of the United States guarantees to the
citizen.1Bll
As in all debates where the issues are closely allied with
passion, there was a great deal of emotional display during the
sixteen months of debate on reconstruction.

This was carefully

fostered by the Radicals, who saw in it the best psychological ap
proach to their ends.

Of course, there was much genuine emotion

and sincere feeling in Congress, but there was also much affecta
tion of sentiment, and oratory which was deliberately kindling.
Stevens, Boutwell and Sumner were masters at this sort of thing.
Their speeches are full of highly inflamatory passages.
"Does the gentleman yet ask for the *specific act1 that
deprived these States of all the rights of States, and made
them Enemies1? . . . They threw off, and defied the authority
of your Constitution, laws, and government. They obliterated
from their State constitutions and laws every vestige of
recognition of your government} they discarded all official
oaths, and took in their places oaths to support your enemy*s
government. They seized, in their States, all the nation’s
property. Their Senators and Representatives in your Con
gress insulted, bantered, defied and then left you. They
expelled from their land or assassinated every inhabitant of
known loyalty} they betrayed and surrendered your armies}
they passed sequestration and other acts in flagitious viola
tion of the law of nations, making every citizen of the
United States an alien enemy, and placing in the treasury of
their rebellion, all money and property due such citizens.
Kiey framed iniquity and universal murder into law. They
besieged, for years, your capital, and sent your bleeding
armies in rout, back here upon the very sanctuaries of your
national power. Their pirates burned your unarmed commerce
upon every sea. They carved the bones of your unburied
heroes into ornaments, and drank from goblets made out of
their skulls. They poisoned your fountains, put mines under
your soldiers* prisons, organized bands whose leaders were
concealed in your homes, and whose commissions ordered the
torch and yellow fever to be carried to your cities, and to
your women and children. They planned one universal bonfire
of the North, from Lake Ontario to the Missouri. They
murdered by systems of starvation and exposure, sixty thousand
of your sons, as brave and heroic as ever martyrs were. They
destroyed in five years of horrid war another army so large
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that it would reach almost around the globe in marching
columns; and then, to give the infernal drama a fitting
close, and to concentrate into one crime all that is
criminal in crime, and all that is detestable in barbarism,
they killed the President of the United States.1,12
This passage comes from a speech of Shellabarger, the keenest
Constitutional lawyer among the Radical group, and the man who,
perhaps more than any other single Radical, won the confidence and
respect of conservatives.

Sumner appealed to the fanatic, Stevens

spoke to the politician, but Shellabarger reasoned with the con
servative patriot, and often he had his way.

Except for Shella

barger, the Radicals had few men who could meet the straightforward
attacks of the Conservatives.

Often several successive speeches

would have nothing in them of worth or argument, but simply empty
emotional appeals, which threw a kind of hypnotic spell over the
meetings, and successfully blinded many conservatives to the real
issue.
Pleas for loyalists were most frequently used.
"Already fifteen hundred Onion men have been massacred
in cold blood— more than the entire population of some of
the towns in my district— whose only crime has been loyalty
to your flag, and In the single state of Texas alone; in
all the revolted states, upon the testimony of your ablest
generals, there is no safety to the property or lives of
loyal men. Is this what the loyal North has been fighting
for? Thousands of loyal white men driven like partridges
over the mountain, homeless, houseless, penniless, today
throng this capital. They fill the hotels, they crowd the
avenue, they gather in these tessalated and marble corridors,
they look down from these galleries, and with supplicating
eyes they ask protection from the flag which floats above the
Speaker*s chair; a flag which to them has thus far unfurled
its stripes, but concealed the promise of Its stars.
For myself, may my right hand forget her cunning, and
my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth if I desert them.
. . . The duty of today, and now, of this hour, Is to stand
by the men who stood by the flag, the noble Union men of the
South, black and white. For one, I mean to do It to the end
of the chapter. • . • While I am ready to extend the olive
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branch of peace when it can be received in the spirit of
peace, I now vote to unsheath the great sword of the Re
public, and place it in the hands of the greatest captain
of the age, that he may demand once more, in the name of
the God of justice, the *unconditional surrender of the
rebellion.*
In line with their policy of stirring emotion and passion,
the Radicals played up the stories of outrages committed in the
South.

These were especially frequent in the first session, and

in the first two months of the second session.
Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, always carried a vest pocket
notebook, in which he entered all the reports of outrages which he
he a r d . ^

Of course he exposed himself to a good deal of ridicule,

but nevertheless his stories were effective.

He presented the

contents of his booklet in the debates, either as stories, or in
tabulated form.
Two examples, the first from Sumner and the second from
Stevens, show the effectiveness of the stories*

In many cases

the extent to which the Radicals were willing to go seems almost
absurd.
nI do not stop to dwell on the instances of frightful
barbarism. There is one which had been authenticated in
the court of the prevost marshal, where a colored girl was
roasted alivet And another writer, in a letter just re
ceived, describes a system of ♦burning* in ?/ilkes county,
Georgia, as *a mild means of extorting from the freed people
a confession as to where they have their arms and money
concealed.* Ho says ‘They were held in the blaze.’ Think
of it sir, here in our country, ’they were held in the
blaze.* And the national government looks onI

"A gentleman from Richmond, who had personal knowledge
of the facts, told me the circumstances of the murder. A
colored man, driving the family of his employer, drove his
wagon against a wagon containing Hatson and his family. The
wagon of Watson was broken. The next day i/atson went to the
employer of the colored man and complained. The employer
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offered to pay Watson every dollar that he might assess
for the damage that had been done* ’Not1 said he, *1 claim
the right to chastize the scoundrel*1 He followed the
colored man, took out his revolver, and deliberately shot
him dead in the presence of the community. No civil authority
would prosecute him; and when taken into custody by the
military authority, he is discharged by order of the Presi
dent*"16
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CHAPTER 17
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CHAPTER IV.
OFFICIAL REPORTS OF CONDITIONS IN THE SOOTH.

In the summer of 1865 President Johnson asked Carl Schurz to
go on a tour of the South, to gather and report Information on the
conditions existing there.
reasons.

Schurz hesitated, because of financial

The Badicals saw here an excellent opportunity to get

"proof" of Johnson*s failure in the South— proof which they could
use in their campaigning for converts.

Stanton told Schurz that

it was **absolutely necessary" for the "cause” that he should go.
Sumner quietly offered to raise a subscription, and this made the
trip possible,1

Schurz left for the South with very definite ideas

as to what his party expected him to find there; of eourse he found
those things.
He left in July, 1865* and spent six weeks touring the states
of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas.2

At intervals he sent reports to the President, and pub

lished a number of unsigned letters in Radical newspapers.

When

Johnson rebuked him for his unauthorized publication in the papers
fte replied angrily that he was doing it unofficially, and that the
people had a right to know what he was finding out about the South.

His report was simply a piece of Radical propaganda, which
intended to show that conditions In the South were not satisfactory,
and that the President’s policy

was

not wise. It may be summed up

in a few words.
The masses of the southern people, and most of the
southern leaders, are loyal, in so far as loyalty can
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consist of submission to necessity. Except in rare cases,
there is an entire absence of that national spirit which
forms the basis of true loyalty and patriotism.
The ordinances abolishing slavery were passed by the
South only under pressure, and the South will not hesitate
to evade them, in spirit or practice. Emancipation is
necessarily observed in outward form but the negro is
regarded, not as free, but as the slave of society*
Legislation on the part of the southern states has ex
pressed the tendency toward this new form of slavery.
There is a tendency to deprive the negro of his
ri#its. This will increase, and the result will be to
plunge the South into resistless fluctuations and anarchi
cal confusion. The only practical method of avoiding this
evil is to continue Federal control until conditions
settle down under a full recognition of the rights of free
labor. Of course, federal supervision is, in Itself, not
wholly desirable, and the period in which it must be exer
cised ought to be made as short as possible. Two things
might help in this. First, the government ought to de
clare that the South will be under supervision until
society is stabalised there. This will have a salutary
effect on the attitude of the South. Second, the govern
ment ought to endow the negro with some measure of
political power. The South will never do this voluntarily,
and the only way to accomplish it will be to make it a
condition precedent to the readmission of the South into
the Union.

6*.

The report was all that the Radicals had hoped for#

Sumner

wrote Schurz that it was "all that I had expected; very able,
elaborate, complete, full of facts and i d e a s . I t was the more
valuable because it was made by a man who inspired so much respect
and confidence.

People did not suspect him.

self sent Schurz there?

Had not Johnson him

And had not Schurz gone down a Johnson

man, and come back convinced that Johnson was wrong?

He made it

very clear that Johnson*s policy was failing to restore the
southern states to such a condition that they could properly take
their places in the Union.

Another fruitful source of Radical propaganda was found in the
official reports of the officers of the Freedmen*s Bureau,

These

reports were very contradictory, and differed from district to
district, hit in general they formed a mass of material very use
ful to the party.
The very nature of the Bureau prevented these accounts from
presenting true pictures of conditions in the South,

The Bureau

was an organization of the Radical party, legalized it is true,
and set in motion by legislative authority, but utilized for party
purposes.

The reports were sometimes deliberately falsified, and

almost always colored by the necessity to paint dark pictures of
conditions, in order to assure the continuance of the Bureau,
Even when conditions were exactly as they were reported, the
Bureau was sometimes at fault#

Bureau officials were directed to

do things which were deliberately irritating to the southern ivhites,
so that they might be goaded into some violence which would furnish
talking points for the Radicals#

Any Indication of disrespect or
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disorder was to be reported at once to the Radicals in Washington,
so that it could be used there.
fostered.

Race conflict was intentionally

Negroes were given false impressions of their rights and

privileges, and so led to make themselves very annoying to the
whites.

It was even claimed that sometimes Bureau officials sug

gested to negroes that they do things which were certain to cause
disorder which could be reported to Washington, and furnish ma
terial for sensational articles.^

No wonder that one young of

ficer in Georgia found his work "fearfully disgusting.
Of course, not all of the officials were dishonest.
hifeer officers were men of sincerity and integrity.

The

But there

were abuses of power, especially among the lower officials.
The reports of the officers were made with great frequency,
and were used in debate.

They served to give apparent substantia

tion to reports of similar conditions from other sources.

Their

use in debate may be illustrated with examples.
"Mr. Donnelly.

I will give . . .

an argument, most potent

and convincing, as to the kind of *peace and quiet* which
now reign in the South without negro suffrage, and which
will remain there so long as negro suffrage is denied.
General Ord has just made a report upon the condition of
thing in Arkansas. He sums up matters as follows:
*Outrages, assaults and murders committed on the
persons of freed men and women are being continually
reported from all sections of the state, and a decided
want of disposition to punish offenders apparently
exists with the local civil officers, and in the minds
of the people. There have been reported fifty-two
murders of freed persons by white men in this state in
the past three or four months, and no reports have been
received that the murderers have been imprisoned or
punished. In some parts of the state, particularly in
the south west and south east, freedmen*s lives are
threatened if they report their wrongs to the agent of
the bureau, and in many cases the parties making the
reports are missed and never heard of afterward. It
Is believed that the number of murders reported is not
half the number committed during the time mentioned.*"7
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"Sc- po.ana.UJ- I will quote from the report of the officers
at theFreedruen*s Bureau, as to the state of affairs in
Tennessee* • • •
*Captain Kendrick reports in substance that having
proceeded to Union City he conversed with many of the
citizens, who told him that but few of the freedmen
were left about there, as they were driving them away
as rapidly as possible. • • • The citizens force them
to fly by * . . shooting, beating, whipping, and cheat
ing them. The superintendent of the bureau there, in
vestigating a case of assault upon a negro, was compelled
to desist by threats upon his life. . . . A freedman
named Callum was whipped by a man named Stanley for say
ing that he had fought in the Union army. A Mr. Roscol,
county trustee, has been persistently persecuted by a
gang of desperadoes because he was prominent in defend
ing the Union, and has been shot at several times while
sitting in his house. About a dozen bullet holes may be
seen in his door.*”8

Another report which was of great value to the Radicals was
that made by the committee which investigated the riot at New
Orleans.

On July 30, 1866, a serious riot broke out at New

Orleans, between the State and municipal authorities on the one
hand, and loyalists on the other.

The situation was very much

complicated by the condition existing throughout the State,

Since

November, 186$, a number of the State offices had been claimed by
two sets of officials, each professing authority.

Johnson* s

reconstructed government was headed by Governor Wells,

Democrats

composed the State legislature, and controlled the city government
of New Orleans.
The old State Convention of 1864 had been out of existence
for a long time, but a meeting was called for July 30, 1866.
Members of the Republican party, (carpetbaggers, scallawags and
negroes,)claimed that Wells called the meeting.

Wells denied it,
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and said that the president of the convention called it.^

At

any rate, the assembling of the convention was opposed by the
State legislature, and by the mayor of Hew Orleans, James Monroe.
On July 25 Monroe applied to General Baird, who was in command of
the military forces near New Orleans, to know if he could be al
lowed to disperse the assembly by arresting its members.

Baird

replied that he could not, but that if there should be any riot
the military would assist the city police in keeping the peace.
On the twenty-eighth there was a Radical Republican mass meeting,
largely attended by negroes, at which "violent and incendiary
speeches were made, and the negroes called upon to arm themselves.
After this meeting the Lieutenant Governor and the Attorney
General of the State telegraphed to Johnson.

They wished to arrest

the convention members under process of the criminal court, and
asked "Is the military to interfere to prevent process of court?"
Johnson, not understanding the situation, replied "Hie military
will be expected to sustain and not to obstruct or interfere with
the proceedings of the c o u r t s . T h i s telegram was later used by
the Radicals in an attempt to show that Johnson was using the
military forces to suppress the convention.
General Baird wired Stanton.

On that same day

"A convention has been called with

the sanction of Governor Wells, to meet here on Monday.

The

Lieutenant Governor, and city authorities, think it unlawful,
and propose to break it up by arresting the delegates.

I have

given no orders on the subject. • • • Please instruct me at once
by t e l e g r a p h , Stanton did not answer.

He later admitted that

he had deliberately withheld the telegram from the President.

Had

Johnson known of it his instructions to Baird, and his reply to
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the Lieutenant Governor would have been effective to prevent the
riot.1^
The convention was to meet Monday noon.

Monroe had given

General Baird the impression that the convention was not to con
vene until six o*elock.

About ten o*clock in the morning, Lieu

tenant Governor Voorhies asked for troupes, and Baird sent for
them, giving instructions that they were to arrive about five
o*clock, an hour before he supposed they would be needed.

In the

morning also, Mayor Monroe enlarged and concentrated his police
force, and gave the men arms.

The convention met at noon, but a

quorum was not present, and the meeting adjourned, intending to
meet again a little later.

During the intermission a procession

of negroes paraded through the streets, and returned to the
Mechanics Institute where the meetings were held.

Just before they

reached the Institute they came into conflict with a mob of whites,
who fired upon them.

The police arrived at once, advancing in

concert from three directions, and Joined the mob in firing.

The

negroes fled into the hall, where the meeting was in progress.
The doors were barricaded, but were broken in, and a most shocking
massacre occurred.

Forty-eight persons were killed, most of than
15
negroes, and more than two-hundred were injured.
By the time
the troupes arrived the massacre was over, but Baird proclaimed
martial law, "because the police are regarded by a large portion
of the community as the rioters, and were feared."1^
Of course, the riot caused much horror throughout the nation.
Sheridan, Baird*s superior, wrote to Grant, "The more information

I obtain of the affair of the thirtieth in this city, the more
revolting it becomes.

It was no riot*

it was an absolute massacre
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by the police, which was not excelled in murderous cruelty by that
of Fort Pillow.

It was a murder which the mayor and police of this

city perpetrated without the shadow of a necessity; furthermore,
I believe it was premeditated, and every indication points to
this#1,17
On August 1, General Baird appointed a military board to
investigate the riots.

The next day the board began taking testi

mony, and continued until late in the month#

The next Congress

appointed an investigating committee, which used the testimony al
ready gathered, and examined the documents of the President, and of
Stanton,

The conclusion was "that the whole drift and current of

the evidence tends irresistibly to the conclusion that there
was . . .

a preconcerted plan and purpose of attack upon this con1S
vention, provided any possible Pretext could be found."
Johnson*s telegram to the Democratic Lieutenant Governor say
ing that the "military will be expected to sustain and not to
obstruct or interfere with the proceedings of the courts," was
very unfortunate.

The Radicals easily convinced people in the

North that Johnson sympathized with the Democrats, that he opposed
the meeting of Republicans, that he hated the negro and was sup
porting the rebels.

The logical next step was to insinuate that

he was aware of the preconceived plan to prevent the meeting, and
had attempted to use the military forces to support the Democrats
and rebels in their plan to break it up.
President Johnson believed that the Radicals in Washington had
been responsible for the riot.

In the fall of 1866, when he made

his famous "Swing Abound the Circle" tour, he spoke at St. Louis.
An interruption, "How about New Orleans?" brought the answer, "If
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you will take up the riot at New Orleans and trace It hack to Its
source, you will find out who was responsible for the blood that
was shed there,

You will find that the riot at New Orleans was

substantially planned in the Radical Congress, • . . You will find
that another rebellion was commenced having its origin in the
Radical Congress."1^

Welles wrote "There is little doubt that the

New Orleans riots had their origin with the Radical majority of
Congress in Washington,

It is a part of a deliberate conspiracy,

and was to be the commencement of a series of bloody affrays through
the States lately in rebellion. . . • Stanton is evidently in deep
sympathy and concert with the Radicals in this matter, « • . (He
is) himself complicated with, if not a prime mover in, the New
20

Orleans difficulties, and these mischievous rumors."'-

Some extracts from the testimony will serve to show, both the
nature of the riot, and the usefulness to the Radicals of such
materials.
From the testimony of F. Mollere, a member of the convention.
(He describes the assembling of the convention, and the siege
of the hall.) "The door was burst again, the third time, by
the police, and Mr. Horton stood in the middle of the hall
with a white handkerchief and said *Do not shootj we stirrender.1 They fired, and Mr. Horton was shot in the arm.
. , . Some of the men jumped out of the window', and the
moment they got down there I saw the policemen fire and
shoot at them. . . . I could see the colored men rushing to
(the police) for protection. Then they would hold them and
shoot them," (He tells how he left the hall with another
man, and went down stairs, where they met a clerk.) "I
said, *For God*s sake do not touch raej protect me.* He
said, *Come down stairs with me.* As I got to the foot of
the steps a regular file of police fired at me, and said,
*Kill him, the God damned Yankee.1 I owe my life to one
of the sergeants of police. The crowd was crying out as I
got to the corner, *Kill him, the damned Yankee — ------ .*
Clark saved my life there by saying I was a rebel. I saw
a poor old colored man on the sidewalk, and I saw three men
rushing behind him with their pistols In their hands. They
were citizens, not police. As they got up to this colored

man one said *Here Is one of them,1 and put his pistol to
his head; and the colored man turned around laughing, and
said ’What is the matter?* As he said that I saw his brains
blown out,’’23*
From the testimony of G. B. Gourdeau, a spectator.
(He describes the killing of a negro watermellon vender.)
I suppose it was for their amusement, nothing else. They
have threatened the lives of the witnesses who testify as
to the killing. Threats have been made to Union men that
if they give testimony to this commission they would have
violence done to them. I have been told that it would be
dangerous for me to give evidence before this court. Loyal
men are being disarmed by the pollge, while others are still
permitted to carry their weapons.22
Here was evidence exactly suited to the Radical*s plans for
propaganda.

The United States flag had been fired upon.

The old

•spirit of the Confederacy was still alive, and even the old Conerate organisations were ready for instant mobilization,

E

ason was open and unashamed, Confederate uniforms were paraded,
old rebel military units were still in organized existence.

Johnson*s government was not able to deal with the situation.
Johnson*s officers, if not Johnson himself, were Confederate
sympathizers*

United States military forces in the South were

accessary, and the President had been found using them to the
interests of the rebels, and to the great hurt of loyal men.

A

number of persons were threatened for giving evidence before the
committee.

The whole Southern attitude was described as one of

fiendish cruelty*

The President was reported to have garbled

the accounts of the riot, and to have permitted the New York
Times to publish expurgated notices of it.

He was said to have

been "reluctant* to give up the correspondence relative to it.2-*
With the skillful Radical stress on these things, what
wonder is it that most of the country agreed that the report was
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ffa mo3t convincing refutation of the foolish assertion * * • that
the President’s Southern policy is just to all, as well as for
giving and conciliatory to the South.
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Perhaps the most Important single piece of propaganda which
the Radicals had at their command was the report of the Joint Com
mittee, made after an exhaustive Investigation Into the condition
of the South*

At the meeting of the Joint Committee on January 12,

1866, Bingham moved "that sub-committees . . .

be appointed to

examine and report upon the present condition of the States com
posing the late so-called Confederate States of America."1

This

was agreed to, and at the next meeting Fessenden appointed the
four sub-committees.
No. I.

No. II.

Tennessee.
Grime s,
Bingham,
Grider,

Conservative.
Conservative.
Democrat.

Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina.
Howard,
Radical.
Conkling,
Radical.
Blow,
Conservative.

No, III. Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas,
Harriss,
Radical.
Boutwell,
Radical*
Morrill,
Radical.
No. IV.

Louisiana, Florida, Texas.
Williams,
Radical.
Washburn,
Radical.
Rogers,
Democrat.

The choice of members for these sub-committees is proof of
Fessendens Radical sympathy.

As has been shown in an earlier

chapter, the work of the sub-coraraittee on Tennessee was already
fairly well mapped out by public opinion in Congress.

The Radicals

seemed to consider that Tennessee was the safest place to concen
trate the Conservatives; at least that was the only sub-committee
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which did not have a Radical majority*
single Radical was wasted there.

It was so safe that not a

The second and fourth sub-cora-

mlttees were each given Radical majorities, and the third was com
posed entirely of Radicals.

It might be objected that, when nine

members out of the group of fifteen were Radicals, Fessenden could
not help giving some Radical majorities.
members discounts that argument.

True, but his choice of

The most influential of the

Radical opponents, Reverdy Johnson, was not given a place on any
committee.

The Tennessee group was packed entirely with Conserva

tives and Democrats, to get theta out of the way.

Since the

Tennessee question had practically been settled outside of the
Committee, a Radical sub-committee there would not have made any
difference,

Fessenden could have given Conservative majorities

to each of the three Important sub-committees,
The sub-committees began at once to take testimony and collect
evidence, and continued work until the end of April.

Witnesses

were all examined in Washington, and this exercised a natural
selective Influence over the character of the people available.
Added to this was a deliberate effort on the part of the Radicals
to pack the number with persons of Radical sympathy.

This ac

counts to a great extent for the extreme tone of the nfindings.”
Army officers who had returned from the South, officers of
the Freedman*s Bureau, southern loyalists, and carpet-bagger
officers of the southern states comprise far the greatest number
of witnesses, bit there was a sprinkling of Southerners, to give
an appearance of impartiality.

These Southerners were of two

kinds; a few were eminently respectable and prominent persons,
such as Robert E, Lee, whose testimony was sane and reasonable;
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"some were southern hot-heads, whose testimony did more harm than
good, and was pointed to with scorn and horror by the Radicals, as
ominous types of what the South was thinking.
four witnesses were called, altogether.

One hundred forty-

Seventy-seven of these

were Northerners living in the South, most of them for periods
less than two years; thirty-eight were northern array officers;
fifteen were officers of the Freedraen* s Bureau; ten were federal
customs collectors; and sixteen were white southern sympathizers.
Of the Northerners living in the South, some were simply persons
making extended travels.
In March, 1666, the majority report, and the verbaturn ac
counts of the witnesses was published, and 150,000 copies were
printed and distributed by the members of Congress.^

The

minority report, signed by Johnson, Grider, and Rogers, was
omitted from the publication, and received scant consideration
except in the Conservative newspapers.
The work of the sub-committee on Tennessee has already been
considered.^- It was much more thorough than that of any of the
other sub-committees.

Hie questions were more spontaneous, and

show less desire to draw the witnesses along a ready-marked line.
The second 3Ub-comnittee, examining Virginia, North and
South Carolina, called seventy-one carefully chosen witnesses,
including several negro ex-slaves.

After much Judicious question

ing this group was able to produce evidence which showed the
following.

Southerners have no respect for the United States,

and the whole South is a "nursery of treason,"

Southerners have

organized Into conspiracies, or "general understandings," which
hope to accomplish the dissolution of the Union by legislative
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means, as soon as representatives are admitted to Congress.
State legislature of Virginia has a rebel majority.
without the "slightest restrictions."
reluctance*

The

Rebels vote

They pay taxes with great

They would probably support enemies of the United

States in the event of a foreign war, and would revive the Con
federacy under such favorable conditions.
the Federal debt*

They would repudiate

The pardons granted by Johnson have had a

mischievous effect In fostering disloyalty, Which is constantly
increasing.

The condition of the freedmen is "deplorable," and

the Freedman* s Bureau is a necessity.

Negro franchise is much

opposed, although negroes are intelligent, and very anxious for
education,

Negroes are frequently whipped, strung up by the

thumbs, or otherwise mistreated*

Tit© courts would not convict

rebels in cases concerning treason, or murder if the case Involved
a negro or a Northerner,

Northerners have "no chance at all" in

State courts.

Opposition to Northerners is very strong, and is
5
fostered by the women and the press.
Testimony taken by the third sub-committee, concerning
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, stressed much the same
things.

The President^ policy of leniency has resulted in a

change of attitude in the South,

Southerners have been "spoiled,

like children," and the anti-Union sentiment is growing more
bitter.

The women and the press are responsible for some of the

continued hostility.

Organized militia and secret societies exist,

whose object is to destroy the Union.

The South would gladly

repudiate the Federal war debt, and will make claims for war
losses and for freed slaves.
cruelty and oppression common.

Freedoen are "persecuted," with
The Freedman*s Bureau is necessary
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to help the Hegro, who is anxious to work and to learn,

ft would

be fatal to withdraw the troups.^
Evidence brought out by the fourth sub-committee, on Louisiana i
Florida and Texas, is similar also.

Disloyalty is increasing.

The pardon system has been unsatisfactory, and voters, and even
State officials are frequently unpardoned rebels.

According to

Governor Marvin of Florida, half of the delegates to the State
legislature were active secessionists, and a quarter more were
Southern sympathizers*

Except for the support of the militia,

nthe raost rabid and violent secessionists” would b© in power.
The Freedmen* s Bureau is necessary to prevent mistreatment of the
negro, and the troups are necessary to help the loyalists*7
The sub-committees had a list of stock questions which were
asked almost all the witnesses.

If there was a southern sympa

thizer giving testimony, the questions were briefer, and many were
omitted.

They did not ask such men as Robert E. Lee, or Governor

Johnson of Georgia, how they and their friends felt toward the
freedmen.

They did not want such answers to appear on the records.

The questions were often leading, and if the witness did not
answer as was expected or desired, they attempted to trap him into
admitting some minor point, over which they made much.

If a

v/itness admitted that he knew of Just one case where a negro was
mistreated., the Radicals were Jubilent, and claimed that his
testimony showed that the Freedmen*s Bureau was necessary to
protect the negro.
With the more ignorant of their witnesses, they often stated
the position, and then asked if It was not so?

For instance the

following, asked with the intent to trap a Southerner into a
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false position.
Question;

I understand it to be your opinion that generosity
or liberality toward the South would be the surest
means of regaining their good opinion?

Answer;

Yes.8

Some typical quotations from the testimony will serve to
show the sort of questions asked, and the kind of ansvv'ers which
were desired.
From the testimony of John W. Hecks, Customs Collector in Florida.
"Question. Then all the officers of the government there,
and those chosen to represent that state in
Congress, as I understand, were chosen by men
who were chosen during the War?
Answer.

Yes sir.

Question. And those who were not pardoned, as well as those
who were, voted for their election?"
(Hecks had
not previously mentioned the voters, or their
qualifications. This was obviously a leading
question.)
Answer.

les sir; and whether they had been there three
days or had lived there three years did not
matter. They would come back, according to the
instructions given by Provisional Governor Marvin,
would vote the next day, pardoned or unpardoned."

From the testimony of J. P. Stiles.
"If these State governments are permitted to
reconstruct, and to go on in the manner they
are going on, the South will remain a nursery
of treason. The rebels say ’we know that we
are whipped; we are overpowered; but we hate
you, and we will teach our children’s children
to hate you!’ Their favorite expression is,
’Every dog has his day, and the time will come,
sometime or other, when an opportunity will
present itself to us.*
Question.

Is that feeling very general?

Answer.

Yes sir.

Question,

'••'hat chance does a Union or a Northern man stand
in their courts.
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... ........
■
Answer.
Ko chance at all, , , , The popular feeling is
against him altogether, and he has it all to
butt against. . * . There is no show for justice
to a Union man in any case that affects rebels*
Question.

VVhat chance does a freedraan stand for justice at
their hands?

Answer.

As a general thing, he does not stand any chance
for justice at all.*9

I

From the testimony of Rev. L. M. Hobbs, of the Freedmen’s Bureau
Educational Service.
"Question. What do you find to be the present temper and
spirit of the people in Florida in reference to
the general government?
Answer.

It is bitterj much more so now than it was three
or four months ago.

Question. How do you explain this change that has taken
place in their feelings, or in the expression
of them?
Answer.

I consider it is because of the lenience mani
fested by the present administration} first in
extending the privilege of amnesty, and second,
in re-establishing the civil government, throw
ing the affairs of the state, the administration
of the law, in the hands of probate and circuit
judges, leaving the military to have control
only in some cases where capital punishment, or
some punishment of that kind, can be inflicted.
Also the general opposition that has grown up
within the last three months to the negro having
civil rights, the right of suffrage, etc."10

In the published report there was an index which listed the
questions asked most frequently,

Under each question was a list

of the witnesses who had made negative answers, and a similar
list of those who had made affirmative answers.

This index

enabled one to see at once how the majority of witnesses stood on
any question.

On every question the majority was with the Radicals.

This was misleading, because of the picked nature of the group of
witnesses.

In addition, the index was not compiled with strict

honesty.

For instance, the question was frequently asked, "Have

you seen, or do you know of, indications of hostility toward the
Onion?"

David Patterson, the President1s son-in-law, was listed

as answering in the affirmative.

That question was not asked

Patterson directly, and the only referenoe which could, by any
stretch of the imagination, bear on the subject is this.
the war . « . (Onion men) were persecuted."11
else on the subject of hostility.

"During

He said nothing

On that same question there

were two others listed as making affirmative answers who did not.
One of them, Governor Johnson of Georgia, was very decidedly
negative in his testimony.

In a number of cases the index was

falsified in a similar manner.
The following tabulation shows the questions asked most
frequently, with the number of negative and affirmative answers,
and the number of such answers found by the various committees.
"Part I," "Part II," etc., refer to the testimony taken by the
first sub-committee, to that of the second sub-committee, etc.

Have you seen, or do you know of
the Union?
Affirmative.
Part I
Part II
III
IV

89

5
39
25
203
2

indications of hostility toward
Negative.
Part I
Part II
III
IV

36
10
15
11

32 of the affirmative answers, and 11 of the negative
answers, were given by army officers. The index lists
92 affirmatives.
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i hostility to the United States increased since the surrender
Lee?
Affirmative.
Part I
II
III
IV

21

Negative.

3

Part I
II
III
IV

1
6
11
3

—

2
1

Negative answers were given by General 0. H. Thomas, and
Governor Johnson of Georgia* The index omits Johnson’s
testimony.

Do the Southerners still hold to their states rights and secession
theory? Would they be willing to fight against the United States
in support of their theories?
Affirmative.
Part I
IX
III
IV

50
22
17
11

Negative.

14

Part I
II
III
IV

1
10
2
1

13 army officers answered in the affirmative.

What effect has the Executive leniency and free granting of
pardons had on the South?
Beneficial.
Part I
II
III
IV

3

3

Harmful.
Part I
II
III
IV

42
29
6
7

The index omits the testimony of R. E. Lee, and gives only
2 who considered the effect beneficial. 6 array men thought
that the effect was harmful.

Do Southern politicians hope to control the Union policy by
political means, as soon as they are elected to Congress?
Affirmative,
Part I
II
III

20
9
10

Negative.
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Southerners were not asked this question.

Is tiie South reluctant to pay taxes for the National debt?
Affirmative.
Part I
II
III
IV

26

Negative.
Part I
II
III
IV

16
7
5

1

—
1

The one negative answer was given by General Lorenzo
Thomas. The question was not asked any of the Southerners.

Will the South expect compensation for slaves emancipated, and
property destroyed during the war?
Affirmative.
Part I
II
III
IV

12

Negative.
Part I
II
III
IV

2

6
4

3
—
1
—
2

Generals Spencer, Thomas and Grierson answered affirmative
ly. Southerners were not asked this question.

Have you seen any manifestations of hostility toward Union men,
whether of the North or South?
Affirmative.
Part I
II
III
IV

71

Negative.

15

Part I
II
III
IV

4
37
14
16

4
7
4

27 army men answered affirmatively, and 5 negatively.
R. E* Lee was listed with the affirmatives. He had
said that he had known of cases where Southern people
would "avoid* Northerners.

Is the Freedman treated with hostility or cruelty?
Affirmative.

87
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Negative,

36
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Part 1
II
III
IV

F<3.r* X

— —

II
III
IV

37
27
20

21
8
7

Will the negro work for a fair wage and good treatment?
Affirmative,
Part I
II
III

IV

59

Negative*

4

Part I
II
III
IV

4
15
26

14

1
2
1

Are the United States troups and the Freedman’s Bureau necessary
in the South?
Affirmative.
Part I
II
III
IV

negative.

73

10

Part I
II
III
IV

5
23
26
19

3
4
3

37 military men answered in the affirmative. Only 3,
among them General Lorenzo Thomas, answered in the
negative.

The majority report appeared with the testimony.

It had

been drawn up by Fessenden, and was signed by every Republican
member of the Committee,

It was very cleverly and subtly worded,

and made to stress the points which the Radicals were especially
anxious to bring out.

The following is a much shortened summary

of the report, and uses the original language wherever possible*
When Congress opened in 1865, the President’s
Message stated, in general terms, what had been done
in the South, but the details were not communicated
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to Congress.

It was apparent that It was not proper to

confide In the judgment of one man, no matter how exalted
his station, when the question involved the welfare of
the Republic in all future time.

Congress felt in

competent to proceed without securing further informa
tion, and hence this testimony was taken.
Southerners claim that, if they had no legal right
to secede, then they never left the Union, and still have
their full rights.

The committee finds this position

untenable, as it would make civil war a pastime at which
any state may play.

It is not Important whether the

South is in or out of the Union.

All must agree that

she failed to perform her obligations to the Union, and
so cannot expect to enjoy its rights and privileges.
Let us look at the facts shown by the evidence
taken by the committee.

Hardly is the war closed be

fore the people of these insurrectionary states come
forward, professing no repentance, glorying In the crime
they have committed, avowing still, as the uncontradicted
testimony of Mr. Stephens and many others proves, an
adherence to the pernicious doctrine of secession, and
insist upon their rights as States, and proclaim that
they will submit to no conditions whatever as preliminary
to their resumption of power under that Constitution
which they still claim the right to repudiate.
The Southern press abounds with abuse of the
institutions and people of the Loyal states.

The na

tional airs are scoffed at, and the national banner Is
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openly insulted at public meetings.

Witnesses of the

highest character, and having the best means of observa
tions, show tliat the Freedmen*s Bureau is almost uni
versally opposed by the mass of the population, and
could not exist efficiently without military protec
tion.

Without the protection of the troups,

men would be obliged to abandon their homes.

loyal
Vindictive

and malicious hatred is felt toward the freedmen.

Prej

udice against color is assiduously cultivated by the
public journals, and leads to acts of cruelty, oppression
and murder, which the local authorities are at no pains
to prevent or punish.

The people of the rebellious

states pay their United Btates taxes with great reluctance,
and would repudiate the national debt if they could do so.
Generally prevailing opinion in the South defends
the legal right of secession.

While the South appears

willing to submit, it is clear that the real motive is a
desire to obtain the advantages which will be derived
from a representation in Congress.

The effect of our

lenience has been to change the abject submission of
the people to an insulting denial of our authority.
There are two points of action open.

The Worth

might waive formalities and admit the Confederate
States at once, trusting to time and experience to
set all things right; but this seems unreasonable to
the committee.

The committee offers the following for

consideration*1. The Southern States were, at the close of the war,
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with no State constitutions or other forms which could
form the basis for legal relations between them and the
United States.
2* Congress can not be expected to recognize their
representatives.
3, Congress would not be justified in admitting
such communities without proper guarantees securing
the civil rights of all citizens. ^

This report proved very valuable to the Radicals.

It was

much used in the election campaigning in 1866, and served to
justify the Radicals to their constituencies.

In Congress too,

it was made to serve its purpose, and had a good deal to do with
the conversion of some of the waverers.

The evidence of verbaturn

testimony, reiterated again and again, seemed to prove only too
clearly that the South needed Congressional attention, and that
Johnson1s reconstruction had been a failure.

By all these ways then, the Radicals strove to build up
public opinion.

That they were deceiving the public they did not

care, so long as the public was convinced.
great.

And their success was

By means of their propaganda they built up their party

from a small group of politicians and fanatics to a great organize
tion which controlled the policies of the government, and embraced
most of the people of the North,

with their propaganda they built

up a background which carried their policies through Congress,
even though their measures were patently unjust and unconstitutional!
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Their program was put through Congress without the aid of any
great debate on their part.

They had simply to point to this

elaborate fabrication of lies which they had built up, and appeal
for support.
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CHAPTER VI.
THE RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1667.

By the time the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress
met in December, 1866, it had become evident that most of the
southern states would refuse the Fourteenth Amendment.
cals were willing that they should.

The Radi

They had shown, by their ac

tion on the Restoration Bill, that they did not really desire that
the amendment should become the basis of reconstruction.
had an excuse for abandoning it as such.

Now they

They stressed over and

over how the South had "flung the Amendment in their teeth."

It

was a satisfying excuse, apparently putting the South at fault for
the failure.
The first week of the session brought forth a number of plans
for a new Congressional reconstruction.
important.

Only two of these were

The second day of the session Brooaall introduced in

the House a resolution that the Committee on Territories be in
structed "to Inquire into the expedience of reporting a bill pro
viding territorial governments for the several districts of country
within the jurisdiction occupied by the once existing states of
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas, and giving to all adult
male inhabitants, . . .

not participants of the late rebellion,
2

full and equal political rights In such territorial governments."
This was passed by a strict party vote, 107 yeas, 37 nays, and 47
not voting.

On December 6, Sumner Introduced a resolution

"declaring the true principles of reconstruction, the jurisdiction
of Congress over the whole subject, the illegality of existing

__

_
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governments in the rebel states, and the exclusion of such states
with illegal governments from representation in Congress, and from
3
voting on Constitutional amendments*”
On December 10, a resolution was proposed providing that the
southern states would be admitted to the Union if they accepted the
amendment.^

This was referred to the Joint Comtaittee, without de

bate, which constituted a practical failure.

Those resolutions in

which Congress was interested, and over which there was division
of opinion, were hotly debated before being referred.

That this

was referred without debate shows the changing attitude of the new
Congress.
On December 13, Stevens introduced a bill providing for civil
5
government in North Carolina.
Since no civil government existed
there, he said, it was the duty of Congress to establish one.

His

bill provided for calling a convention, which should frame a state
constitution, and submit it to Congress.

All male citizens, 21

years of age or over, who could read or write, or whom might own
in fee real estate to the assessed value of $100 or more, might
vote for the members of this Convention.

No one who had had the

right to vote before was to be disqualified, but in order to
eliminate southern members from the Convention, it was provided
that the delegates must take a very strict oath.

The bill also

provided for indictment for perjury, if the oath was taken falsely,
and no person could serve on the jury at a trial on such a charge,
until he had himself taken the oath.

With this bill Stevens was

feeling his way, and testing the temper of Congress.
Within a week Stevens had offered a new and elaborate plan
of reconstruction.

This he called a substitute for the Restoration

___________________ _

___________________ 92.

bill of the preceding session, hoping thereby to prevent Its being
referred back to the Joint Committee.

The bill provided that,

while the Johnson governments were illegal, they would be recognized
as valid for municipal purposes, until they could be altered in
accordance with this bill.

A convention was to be called, to

draw Tip a new state constitution, which must be impartial, without
regard to language, race, or former condition.

The voters, and

the members of the convention, were to be male citizens, 21 years
of age, or over.
fied.

Certain classes of former rebels were disquali

The state constitution was to be submitted to Congress, and

if it was satisfactory, senators and representatives would be re
ceived, and the state admitted to the Union.

Amendments to the

bill which were accepted after debate suspended the writ of habeas
corpus, and placed the states under martial law.6

After much de

bate, Bingham moved that the bill be recommitted to the Joint Com
mittee,

Stevens opposed this strenuously, but he was defeated,

and the motion carried, 88 yeas, 65 nays, and 38 not voting.

7

The

committee spent two days in discussion of the bill, but the members
were none of them very favorable to it*

All of Stevens’ efforts

to bring the i ssue to a vcte were evaded, end he was again de
feated.^
In the meantime, George V . Julian, of Indiana, had offered to
the House a solution for the problem.

He believed that Congress

was not yet ready to make an adequate plan of reconstruction,
more time was needed to v/ork out details in a satisfactory manner.
The best way would be to protect the southern loyalists, black and
white, by establishing military governments in the South*

Then

Congress could take time to provide for the details necessary to

establish permanent civil governments*
Taking the cue from Julian, Senator williams, of Oregon, on
February 4* 1S67, introduced a bill providing for the establishment
of military governments.10

This bill was discussed in the Joint

Committee on February 6, and became the basis for the Reconstruc
tion Act of larch 2, 1867.
The Committee incorporated some changes in the bill, all but
one unimportant.

The ••illiams Bill had provided for a military

commander for each state; the committee divided the whole South
Into five military districts.

Conkling was responsible for the

changes made, Bingham and Keverdy Johnson stood almost alone in
opposition*

Bingham proposed six different amendments, all of

which were refused by every member but Johnson.^

This was the

last meeting of the Joint Committee at which business was trans
acted.
The bill, as reported, may be summarized briefly.
1. The South was divided into five military districts*
Virginia was to constitute the first district; North
Carolina and South Carolina the second district;
Georgia, Alabama and Florida the third district;
Mississippi and Arkansas the fourth district; and
Louisiana and, Texas the fifth district.
2. The General of the Army was to assign an officer
to the command of each district, and provide for a
sufficient military force.
3. Civil tribunals might be used, but military judg?aent
was permitted^ exercised through military commis
sioners. Military trials were to be held when the
commanding officer judged them necessary. The acts
of commissioners must be approved by the commanding
officer, in cases involving life or death.

4

.

No writs of habeas corpus might be Issued against
proceedings or judgments of the commissioners.12
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Stevens presented the M i l to the House on February 6, 1867.
He was very anxious to have it passed at once, as "any unnecessary
delay must be fatal to the bill**

He thought that one day would

be plenty of time, and endeavored to block all demands for more
time, for debate and study*

He pointed out that there were only

fifteen days of the session left*

"We are not at liberty to in

dulge our friends on the other side by adjourning the action of
the bill. * . » Tomorrow, God willing, I will demand the vote.
Nevertheless, he was not able to get the vote on that day.

Debate

continued for a week, during which time there were many amendments
proposed.

Only one of these is important, that offered by Blaine,

on February 12.

It added the provision that, if the Fourteenth

Amendment should be accepted by three-fourths of the states then
in the Onion, it should be considered adopted.

Southern states

might then be admitted as soon as they accepted the amendment.^
Naturally enough, the extreme Radicals opposed the Blaine amend
ment.

Some eighty-five of the more conservative Republicans sup

ported it.

The stupidity of the Democrats killed it.

They thought

that if they srevented any amendments, the whole bill would fall,
and so they alligned themselves with the Radicals, in opposition
to the conservative Republicans.

In a preliminary division on a

motion to recommit, the vote stood 85 Republicans to 78 Radicals
15
and Democrats.
There v/ere enough conservative Republicans to
defeat the Radical-Democrat combination, and it appeared that the
Blaine amendment would be adopted,
Stevens saved the day for the Radicals, by making a very
powerful speech, which "may be placed as one of the few ever
delivered in Congress that have resulted in the changing of
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votes*The

speech was simply an appeal of the usual Radical

sort, but it had such far reaching effects that a brief summary of
it is not out of place.

Stevens began by deploring the fact that

Congress had been sitting idle vdiile the South had been bleeding
at every pore'.

He regretted that nothing had been clone before,

but felt that the delay was not the fault of the Joint Committee,
nor of himself.

He had previously offered a bill vhich had been

defiantly refused.

This bill had been received in the same spirit*

Gentlemen objected to its particles and its articles, but did not
make fundamental objections.

They tried to amend, it in such a way

as to pledge future Congresses to admit the South on the basis of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

This was simply a proposed step toward

universal amnesty and universal Andy-Johnsonisra.
action.

He appealed for

The deeds of this burning crisis would cast their shadows

far Into the future, and the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress
would appear upon the bright pages of history just in so far as
they gave their aid to promote the great cause of humanity and
universal liberty.

Some gentlemen objected to the bill, favoring

Athenian or Galilean forgiveness and mercy*

Yet those doctrines

apply only to private offenses, and not to political crimes.
Those who paliate the conduct of rebel traitors, whose hands are
red and whose garments are dripping with the blood of their
murdered kinsmen, are covering themselves with indelible stains,
which all the waters of the Nile can not wash out.
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As a direct result of this speech, sixteen conservative
Republicans changed their votes*

On the final vote to recommit,

the division was 69 yeas, (conservative Republicans) to 94 nays,
(Radicals, Lomocrats and the sixteen conservatives.)'10

The bill passed the house, without amendment, by a vote of
109 to 55.

Stevens* comment, when the vote was announced, was

n,Heaven rules as yet, and there are Gods above,tw
The bill was introduced into the Senate on February 13, by
Williams, who announced that he intended to add the amendment
offered in the House by Blaine,

But the next day he withdrew his

offer, after having "consulted with persons who know and advise
me, . . .

I deem it my duty under the circumstances, to oppose all

amendments to this bill.

But a number of the Senators would

not accept the bill without the amendment.

Two days of debate led

to a party caucus, on February 16, which reported very late that
night, with a substitute bill, 'which combined the Reconstruction
bill and the Blaine amendment, with one change in each.

The

President, instead of the general of the- army, was to appoint the
military commanders in the districts, and the Southern states must
modify their constitutions to provide for universal suffrage.
After an all night session, the Sherman substitute passed in the
Oft
morning of the eighteenth, by a vote of 29 to 10,
Two days later the Sherman substitute was refused by the
House, when the Democrats again voted with the Radicals,

But the

Senate refused to abandon the substitute, and the House decided
to accept it with two additional provisions.

Ho person who would

have been excluded from holding office by the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, could serve as a member of a state Constitu
tional convention, nor vote for its members.

Until the southern

states should be admitted to Congress, their governments were to
be considered as provisional only.
provisions by a. vote of 35 to 7.

The Senate accepted the House
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The bill was sent to President Johnson, who returned it with
a veto on March 2.

It passed over the veto, the same day, in

both the Senate and the House, and in both chambers the majority
supporting the bill against the Presidents veto was larger than
22
the majority passing the bill at first.
However, it must not
be supposed that this increase was due entirely to opposition to
President Johnson,

A number of Democrats and the more conservative

Republicans, led by Reverdy Johnson, voted to override the veto,
in order to get this bill passed during the Thirty-ninth Congress.
It was known that the Fortieth Congress would be much more Radical
than the Thirty-ninth, and these men wished to accept this bill,
to prevent the next Congress from passing one even more objec
tionable.
An outline summary of the progress of the bill follows.
THE RECONSTRUCTION ACT.
Hguse.

&&&££*

g2.ug.e-

Hous.e..

1867.

February 6.

Bill reported by Stevens.

February 12.

Blaine Amendment proposed.

February 13.

Bill passed, without amendment.
109 yeas, 55 nays.

February 13.

Bill introduced by Williams.

February 16.

Republican caucus agreed on Sherman
Substitute.

February 17.

Sherman Substitute accepted,
10 nays.

February 19.

Sherman Substitute refused.
98 nays.

February 19.

Sherman Substitute Insisted upon.

February 19.

Sherman Substitute accepted with additional
provisions. 126 yeas, 46 nays.

29 yeas,
73 yeas,

98.
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■
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Senate.

11'■

February 20.

Presidential veto.

---- ■

■'

House provisions accepted.

■ ^

35 yeas, 7 nays

March 2.

House.

March 2.

Passed over veto.

135 yeas, 48 nays.

Senate.

March 2.

Passed over veto.

38 yeas, 10 nays.

Iterate m
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£k<-U,fia-lg, with the Conservative Rebuttal.
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tory.
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Argument.

The South is conquered terri

She resorted to arms, and was not victorious.
Conservative Rebuttal.

The last war was not one of

conquest, but was fought to enforce lav/ and preserve
the Union.

There was no subjugation about it.2^

Radical Constructive Argument.

The har3h provisions of the

bill are justified by the laws of nations relating to conquered
provinces.

According to the law of nations, a conquered state is

subject to the wishes and dictates of her conqueror.

It is

clearly the right of the victorious government to decide what to
do with the South, and Congress is justified in holding the van
quished belligerent in the grasp of war until all the issues in
volved in the war have been secured.

____
Conservative Rebuttal.
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^

V.lien tv/o nations fight, there

may be conquest of nev/ territory.

But here the North did

not gain anything that had not already been held.
not conquer a single inch of territory.

She did

It would be im

possible for the Federal government to conquer her own
o/
territory.

SflasIgHfiU ’
gfi

I’he army

must precede civil

government in the South, to pave the way, and protect the civil
authority.

The South must be kept in check with the bayonet and

the sword until civil government can be safely established.
Conservative Rebuttal.

The army should precede civil

government only Then there is 3oae obstacle to civil
government which is not to be overcome by any other means.
There is no such obstacle in the South at the present
time.

Tiie only proper function of the military in the

South is to enforce the laws and the v/ill of the civil
government.

It is true that the South is in a state of

more or less disorder.

But when Kansas was in

a

similar

condition no military regime was established there.
Neither is it necessary now in the South.

Acflaasnfca &

aa£ itei&tsfl Jsz

Sraaam f a lvea*

The President has no power to reconstruct the South.
belongs with Congress.

That

Only Congress can express the will of the

__________________________________ ________ ._____________
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people, and viien the President trys to follow his plan he sets
himself in opposition to the will of the people.

The governments

which the President has set up in the South are illegal, not only
because the Executive has no legal right to establish them, but
because they are not republican in form or purpose.

There are no

states In the South; there are only pretended states, the instru
ments of power in the hands of a usurper.

These governments must

be repudiated, and set aside. ^

The Federal government has proved that is impossible to
reconstruct the South by co-operating with her people.

Since they

refuse to co-operate in rebuilding what they have destroyed,
Congress must remove the rubbish and build from the bottom.

They

refused the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis of reconstruction,
and flung it back in our teeth with contempt and scorn.
made a generous and magnanimous offer.
now it is our turn to act.

We have

It was not accepted, and

07

Throughout the whole region of the states reconstructed by
the Executive the principles of the rebellion are as thoroughly
in possession of the country as they have ever been.

The rebel

lion is alive, and strong, and is manifested in defiance to the
authority of the United States,
despotic,

The South is disorganized; it is

Freedmen and loyalists are not safe in the possession

of their property*

Their lives are endangered.

oppression are common*

These are proven facts.

Cruelty and
28

101.

Congress must do its duty for the loyal people in the South.
For two years persecution, exile, and murder have been the order
of the day.

These loyal men must be protected from the cruelties

of anarchy, from persecutions by the malignant, and from vengeance
visited upon them on our account.

To discard them, now that the

war is over, is a great evil, and one of the greatest crimes of
DO
the age.

If Congress does not advance some plan of reconstruction,
the rebel South will.

Already the rebel leaders are dictating

terms to the government*

If we adopt no practical plan for re

construction, we shall have to accept terms at their hands.

®e

must not submit to enter into treaty as equals with those who
brought on the v/ar.

The people of the North demand Just such a plan of reconstruc
tion.

The people insist that this question be settled, and by

their own representatives.

At the last election, the people,

having heard the stories of Southern refugees, told us that they
demanded protection for them.
elected on that promise.

We promised to give it, and were
31
Yet we have done nothing.

_______________________________________________________ ___
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Agaaasa&a &£ JSm .Saa^ m ^ yes, wi£h t&e fta£to.i iiaMfctai-

OftBaeffyatfrY? C2.q&fcSasA&g A^gumgn^.

The bill Is unconstitu

tional, as It is a war measure passed In time of peace.

The

Constitution permits martial law only in cases of insurrection
or invasion.

There certainly is no invasion.

Insurrection does

not exist in the South, except in some isolated districts.

This

bill places the whole country under martial law,
£M1S,§1

The country is still, for all

practical purposes, in a state of war.

There are two

states of war, ila^gafit, and peasants.

The later

condition is now upon the country#

The bill is not

unconstitutional, although it is a war measure,

It

Is a now article of war, commanding the array to return
to its work of putting down the rebellion.

It begins

where Grant left off, and holds those revolted com
munities in the grasp of war, until the rebellion
shall have laid down its spirit, as it has already
laid down its arms.

Bayonet and sword are the only

effective weapons we can send South, and the living
spirit of the rebellion Justifies us in the use of a
war measure.

gon?,ery,atto Constructive Argument.

The bill is unconstitu

tional, as Congress Is not justified in establishing a suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Constitution provides that the
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writ can not be suspended except In case of Invasion, that Is,
flagrant war.

There now exists no such emergency as to make this

action necessary.
Radical Rebuttal.

The rebellion has been crushed

by war, but it is still sufficiently strong to over
throw and defy the courts.

If the courts were open

everywhere for redress of violence, then we should
not be justified in suspending the writ.
Is not the case.

But this

The bill assumes that the country

is in a condition which makes such action necessary.
The courts in the South are not really entitled to
enjoy the privilege of the writ, anyway.

Only

legitimate and recognized governments have such a
privilege.-^
mmnw, nwniw»ww»—
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The bill is unconstitu

tional, as it takes the President1s power as commander-in-chief
of the army and navy.

The President, and not the General of the

Array, ought to have the power to appoint the commanders of each
district.

The President has supreme command of the army, and

Congress can not, under the Constitution, assume to command it.
IMjgjai Ma&fcSl*

Congress does have the power to

order and direct the army and navy.
done by legislation.

It has often been

For instance, the Act of 1807,

which ordered vessels to the coast survey, and the Act
of 1832, which also detailed forces for the coast
survey.

The President is commander-in-chief of the
j
----

104.

armies and navies of the United States, but the
armies and navies are made instruments of the govern
ment for the execution of the law.

It is the business

of the government to make laws, and the President must
execute them.

Although the President is comtaander-in-

chief, Congress is his commander, and he must obey.^

SattSfim t a J Efi QaBSiamtaYfi

The bill makes no pro

vision for doing away with military rulers, and establishing civil
government.

Such harsh bills are always called temporary, when

they are first promoted.

And even if the next Congress wishes to

repeal the bill, a mere majority in one house, or an unfavorable
President, could prevent it.

Besides, it is not safe to trust

any group of human beings with so much power, and then expect
them to surrender it.

The bill Itself must place its limit.

Radical Bebuttal.

The measure is intended to be of

brief duration, and will, of course, be repealed when
the time comes.

So one contemplates that this bill

will be a permanent measure.

It is of a temporary

character, and is demanded by present exigencies.
When those are removed, this measure will be abrogated and abandoned,

35

fiaaagagaLU.Y.S P.flaa.frnw.
U 'gg Argument.
the principles of free government.

The bill is at war with
One-third of our people and
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state3 are arbitrarily put under military government.

This bill

inaugurates enough to destroy any government ever founded*
Radical Rebuttal.

The bill is simply a police bill,

which is necessary if the government is to be preserved.
It has been made necessary by the wrong kind of recon
struction being promoted in the South.
a reconstruction bill at all.

This bill is not

It is simply a police

bill, ’«hieh will protect the loyalists, and hold the
South for the Union, until Congress can perfect suitable
measures of reconstruction.^

s£

fiflqftm&t&aaa* m l Itefatsa Sz £ &

The bill is unconstitutional, because it gives absolute
power to a military ruler.

The commanders in the five districts

have complete, absolute, unrestricted power to administer the
affairs of those states according to their own caprice and will.
Such military despotism is at variance with the principles of

yj
our government.

The court system set up by the bill is not Constitutional.
It denies the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury, to be informed of the nature of the charge, to be confronted
with witnesses, to have compulsory process for obtaining wit
nesses, to have the assistance of council.

This bill simply
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provides for a court martial.

It is opposed to the unanimous

decision of the Supreme Court, which judged, in the Milligan Case
that 'military courts do not have authority where civil courts are
38
established, or over citizens not in the army or navy.

The bill extends too far, and is dangerous because of Its
great breadth.

There are portions of the South where it is not

needed at all*

All parts of the South have some loyal persons,

and tills bill affects them with the same harshness and severity
it affects the rebels.

There should be some provision for flexi

bility.39

The best interests of the country are being destroyed for
party considerations, and for special and particular interests.
Radical politicians do not want a complete and final reconstruc
tion.

They proposed the Fourteenth Amendment as a plan of re

construction, but it was not really intended to be one.

Many

members of Congress are very anxious to prevent the Southern
States from being reconstructed, because then their representa
tives will have to be admitted, and the present majority will
lose its power*

Their plan Is to prevent their opponents from

voting, and so carry their measures.4°

_

_
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SM. Vfite ^Lasiaasa*
In his annual messages President Johnson had always discussed
reconstruction, but he had approached the subject, not as a ques
tion to be debated, but as a problem on which he had taken action.
He stated simply what had been done, and gave almost no clew as
to what he thought of the plans of the Radicals.

Of course, in

his messages when he vetoed the Freedraen1s Bureau Bill and the
Civil Rifcts Bill, he gave some revelation of his stand on Radical
reconstruction.

But it is in his message of March 2, 1867,

vetoing the Reconstruction Act, that he shows his position most
clearly.

He believed that conditions in the South were satis

factory, and charged the Radicals with forming their policy to
promote party interests.^*
For the most part, his specific objections to the bill were
those which had been already advanced in Congress.

He felt that

the bill violated the principles of American liberty, by placing
all the people of ten states under absolute military domination,
Tiie only justification for such action must be that there was no
protection for life or property, and this was not the case.

The

power of the commanding officers was that of absolute monarchs,
and history has shown that it has never been safe to trust un
restrained authority to any class of men.
Constitutional.

Ihe bill was not

First; the Constitution does not sanction

vassalege, even in extreme cases where it has been necessary to
resort to armed force.

Second; the Constitution forbids the

exercise of judicial power except by the ordained and established
courts, and it expressly provides for trial by jury.

Third;
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the United States is bound to provide each state with a republican
form of government.

Fourth; bills of attainder are expressly

forbidden by the Constitution, yet here is a bill of attainder
against nine million people.

Fifth; the Federal government has

no right to Interfere with the provisions of any state concerning
its franchise*

He pointed out that if the Southern governments

were illegal, then the Thirteenth Amendment was not a part of the
Constitution, since it had been passed upon by the southern states.
He believed that to pass this bill would seem to bear out the
claim of Southerners that they had been fighting for their liberty.
They would become heroes.

Of course, the war had really been

fought to preserve the Union, and not to prevent Southerners
from gaining liberty.

Congress had formally declared, in July,

1861, that the preservation of the Union was the object of the
•war*

T!iis bill would repudiate that declaration, and would

constitute a breech of plighted honor*

With the passing of the Reconstruction Act over the Presi
d e n t s veto on March 2, 1867, the Radical party reached the peak
of its power*

It was supported by the great majority of people

in the North, it was in absolute control of Congress, it was in
a position to dictate government policies, and it stood on the
threshold of absolute, despotic control of a third of the country
and its people*
All this had been achieved In less than two years time*

In
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December, 1855, the party had no organized existence#

Four months

later it had attained sufficient support in Congress to override
a Presidential veto.

By the fall of 1866 the group was strong

enough to sweep the national election.

And in March, 1867, it

had the force to put through Congress, over the President1s veto,
a bill which was patently unconstitutional, which was cruel and
unjust to a third of the people of the country, and whose only
recommendation was party expediency.
Such a meteoric rise would have been impossible, but for
throe thing, leadership, party cohesion, and a happy choice of
party principle.

The Conservatives were poorly led, and had few

men of ability in their ranks#

Against them the Radicals set up

their efficient organization and their astute leadership.

At the

beginning of the first session their politicians, men of skill and
experience,

lapped out the chief features of their program, and

decided on the methods of attack.

They carefully drew up their

plans, which went through unchecked,

they secured the Joint

Committee at once, and were assured that they would have time to
perfect their own program without interference from the President* s
plan already functioning, or from the delegates from the South who
were clamoring for admittance into Congress.

They were able to

force an open break between Congress and the President, and so
made their own plan of opposition to the President considerably
easier.

To the leaders of the party belongs this early success.

The party had still too few members to carry such a program by
weight of numbers.

But by adroit political manipulation, skillful

playing off of interests, and shrewd use of parliamentary tech
nicalities, a very successful beginning was made.
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The South was the chief concern of Congress in 1866, and
reconstruction v;as the natural thing for the Radicals to stress.
But thoir stand on it was remarkably fortunate, from their point
of view*

It is very doubtful whether they ever could have swept

to their great success on any other program*

Their reconstruction

policy coincided v/ith the war bitterness remaining in the North,
it was admirably adapted to propaganda, it made fine material for
emotional appeal*

It was a vote-getter*

But even reconstruc

tion, unsupported, could never have made the party whet it became*
It remained for the party leaders to promote their program, and
present it to the public.
the Radical success.

This promotion was the chief cause of

Probably no political party has ever been

more successful in its advertising, or used more subtly clever
means for furthering its ends*
The one word, propaganda, covers the whole policy of the
Radical p-trty, but it tells nothing of the scope of the effort.
Men in high places gave interviews colored by Radical sympathy;
government officers sent reports substantiating the Radical state
ments; unknown persons flooded the North with letters bearing out
Radical contentions; unsuspecting citizens repeated shocking
stories put in circulation by the party pro3s; and unscrupulous
politicians falsified reports to gain favor with the party.
Radicals used them all.

The

They carefully built up an elaborate

fabrication of lies and mls-representation, and covered their
work cautiously, so as to make it all seem spontaneous and true.
By these under-cover methods the party gained wide, almost uni
versal, credanee for their falsehoods, and were able to use them
as a most effective background for their debate.

Because of this peculiar situation, the debates on the Re
construction act introduced in February, 1867, differ from the
debates on almost any subject ever brought up in Congress.
debaters offer proof for what they say.

Here the Radicals simply

made statements without any effort to substantiate them*
could rely on their previous work to support them.
debate, in the usual sense of the iford*
language, and emotional appeal.

Usually

They

There was no

There were only kindling

They simply pointed to their

elaborate structure of propaganda and appealed for support.

The

key to the whole Radical position was expressed by Hotchkiss,
when he said nI need not appeal to facts to substantiate what I
say*

They are patent; every child that reads knows that what X

say is true.”

So wide-spread had been the Radical propaganda

that every voter that read thought that what he said was true.
Out of these debates grew a government policy which shaped
the whole future of the South.

The country was plunged into a

labor problem which immeasurably retarded her economic develop
ment.

Her government became chaotic*

A bitter race war developed,

Inevitably, and this conflict still exists in the South, and
continues to produce grave evils, political and social.

The

reconstruction question was one of the most important that ever
faced an American Congress.

It is regrettable that the issue

was settled on a basis of party expediency, rather than with
regard to the future welfare of the nation.

_
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